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Abstract  
This paper argues that  we should accept the existence  of numbers as abstract 
objects.  I  begin by looking at the Indispensabil ity Argument as a posit ive argument 
for the existence of mathematical  objects .  I  look at various discuss ions that 
chal lenge the Ind ispensabi l ity Argument,  most notably that we can dismiss the 
doctrine of  Conf irmational Hol ism by looking to an argument that we use 
f igurat ive talk in sc ience, such as idealisat ions. This is  the argument that ,  l ike 
ideal isat ions,  mathematical  objects are only  used in sc ient if ic  theories f iguratively 
and as such their ex istence is  not confirmed by the success of the scient if ic  
theories they are included in.  In order for this objection to stand ,  it  needs to 
explain what f igurative uses are and so I  look at M athematical  F ict ional ism , which 
aims to explain these uses for mathematical  statements.  I  look at Yablo’s 
f ict ionalism, as the strongest argument for explaining this,  and explain how he 
hopes to dismiss our commitment to the existence of mathematical  objec ts by 
arguing that they are ‘creatures of existential  metaphor’ .  Final ly ,  I  raise issues 
with this explanation and conclude that ,  without further argument ,  the f ict ionalist  
posit ion does not convincingly dismiss our commitment to the existence of 
mathematical  objects and so we should accept the ex istence of numbers as 
abstract objects .   
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Introduction 
The following wi l l  investigate  whether we should accept the existence of numbers 
as abstract objects.   
In part 1,  I  d iscuss the indispensabi l ity  argument. This wil l  be the foundation of 
my argument for the existence of numbers as abstract objects.  I  wil l  assume for 
my argument that natural ism is accepted as  our preferred ontological  standpoint,  
but I  wil l  also explain brief ly Quine’s  (1960) motivation for accepting natural ism 
and how it  al lows the indispensabi l ity argument to come out (section 1.1).  
Following this natural ist  groundwork, I  wil l  explain how the indispensabil ity 
argument leads us to the conclusion that we should be committed to the existence 
of mathematical  objects (section 1.2).  In section 1.3 ,  I  shall  discuss  Field’s (1980) 
attempt to show mathematics as dispensable to scienti f ic  theory and whether this 
succeeds in undermining the conclusion of the indispensabil ity argument . I  wi l l  
conclude that he does not do so completely.  In sect ion 1.4 ,  I  wil l  look at issues 
taken with the conformational holism premise of the indispensabil ity argument,  
led by arguments raised by Leng  (2010).  In this ,  I  wil l  d iscuss the issues of direct 
evidence and idealis at ions and I  wil l  give Leng’s argument that ,  just l ike 
ideal isat ions,  the use of mathematics in sc ientif ic  theory can be taken to be 
f igurat ive. Sect ion 1,  and the hope of the indispensabi l ity argument’s conclus ion 
will  be shown to  rest on whether mathemat ical  statements can be used 
f igurat ively in this way, which leads to section 2.  
Part 2 discusses f ict ionalism. I  f irst  give an outl ine of  what mathematical  
f ict ionalism is and, in section 2.2 ,  I  show why f ict ionalism needs to have some 
involvement from fic t ion or a theory of f ict ion. In section 2.3 ,  I  outl ine the 
similar it ies and differences that mathematics and f ict ion have, and I  use these to 
narrow down those that are important to the quest ion of ontology for 
mathematical  objects.  In sect ion 2.4 onwards,  I  look at Yablo’s  (2005) explanation 
of mathematical  objects as creatures of metaphor and how he reaches this 
conception. After showing how he takes ser iously the comparison between 
mathematics and useful f ict ions,  I  out l ine his attempt at explaining the 
correctness and objectivi ty of mathematics in terms of metaphor. Whilst  not being 
ful ly  f leshed out,  he gives an idea of how this explanat ion might go. In sect ion 2.5,  
I  raise issues for Yablo’s f ict ional ism. The main issue is  that Yablo’s  account does 
not explain satisfactor i ly  where mathematical  statements get their content from, 
and seems to lead to a posit ion where they generate their own content.  This  is  
unacceptable  and is  not how fict ion  or metaphor should be  taken to work. L inking 
this back to section 1.4,  I  wil l  show how , for this reason,  mathematics cannot be 
the same as ideal isat ions when taken to be used f igurat ively.  Because of this,  
f ict ionalism cannot give a ful l  explanation of why we are not committed to the 
content of our mathematical  statements and the conclusion o f the indispensabi l ity 
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argument is  not undermined. This  means that we should accept the existence of 
numbers  as abstract objects .  
The f irst  part of this paper wi l l  out l ine and explicate the wel l-established 
discussion surrounding the indispensabi l ity argum ent as an argument for this 
existence of mathematical  objects.  As a result  of this ,  it  wil l  fol low closely the 
arguments made in Leng (2010),  as these arguments do great justice to the 
discourse surrounding this topic.  The purpose of this is ,  f irst,  to show where I  
agree the strengths of  the indispensabil ity argument are and , second, to set up 
the posit ion that many nominalists (such as Leng) reach . Where relevant ,  I  include 
references to further discussion in the f irst  part of this paper,  but  my aim is to 
reach the posit ion I  would l ike to counter as  clearly as poss ible,  and this is  done 
by fol lowing and explaining the arguments put forward by Leng.  
Part 1 Indispensabil ity  
In this sect ion, I  shall  discuss  the indispensabil ity argument as an avenue to an 
attractive conclusion for the existence of mathematical  entit ies.  Fo llowing from a 
natural ist  background and the premises of indispensabi l ity and conformational 
holism, the argument is  able to conclude that mathematical  ent it ies are 
indispensable to sc ientif i c  pract ices.  As a  result,  their existence is  confirmed by 
the success of said theories.  I  wil l  give an outl ine of the motivations for the 
natural ist  posit ion and how it  a l lows a move into the indispensabil ity argument. I  
wil l  explain the argument and show how, if  sound, it  g ives an attractive conclusion 
for the existence of mathematical  ent it ies .  Following this ,  I  wi l l  discuss some of 
the issues that have been raised for the indispensabi l ity argument,  starting with 
Field’s  (1980) attempt to make mathematical  entit ies dispensable to scienti f ic  
pract ices.  Then,  after showing that  his attempts are not very convincing ,  I  wil l  
look at issues taken with conformational hol ism. One of these issues,  raised by 
Leng (2010),  wil l  ult imately t ry to undermine the indispensabil ity argument by 
showing that  the use of mathematics is  analogous to idealisations and s imilarly 
can be used f iguratively without their  existence being confirmed. I  wil l  then raise 
a few questions for this posit ion and ult im ately conclude that the indispensabil ity 
argument st i l l  holds and is  a good route for someone to take to show that 
mathematical  entit ies exist.   
1.1 Natural ism 
When asking the question of what there is,  there are many approaches that have 
been taken. One approach is  that of natural ism. For the purposes of this paper ,  I  
wil l  be taking this as the approach that  says the question of ontology is  answered 
by scientif ic  practice alone; there are no further quest ions after this .  So ,  
according to natural ism , we should bel ieve in the entit ies posited by our best 
scient if ic  theories and there are no further quest ions as to whether we are r eally 
justi f ied in our belief  in these entit ies.  For the naturalist ,  philosophy should be 
continuous with sc ientif ic  enquiry,  not some higher -level judge that presides over 
it .  For the purposes of  the fol lowing ,  I  wi l l  be taking naturalism as  an assumption 
6 
 
but wi l l  a lso show how Quine motivates the posit ion by showing how he draws a 
posit ive ontological  conclus ion from Carnap’s scept ical  assumptions.  
One motivation to reject ‘f irst  philosophy’ is  Carnap’s (1956) quietism. Leng 
explains as fol lows:  
‘he puts forward his famous dist inct ion between internal and external questions 
regarding the existence claims of a given discourse, or l in guist ic framework. 
According to Carnap,  i f  we ask the quest ion ‘Do ϕs exist?’,  we may mean to ask 
the question from a perspective internal or external to a  given framework. As an 
internal question, ‘Do ϕs exist?’  amounts to the question,  ‘ Is  the utterance “There 
are ϕs” justif ied according to the internal rules of the framework?’ . . .  What 
worries philosophers,  Carnap thinks,  is  not these internal,  often tr iv ial ,  ex istence 
quest ions,  but rather,  the question ‘Do ϕs exist?’  understood when asked from a 
perspective that  is  external to the framework in quest ion. But the holist ic  
realization that it  is  only within the context  of a theoretical  f ramework that 
asentence such as ‘There are ϕs’  is  given meaning precludes the possibi l ity of 
there being any meaningful ex ternal philosophical  quest ion of this  sort.  The 
phi losopher aims to set aside the presupposit ions of a g iven l inguist ic framework 
to ask whether the objects said to exist  in the context of that framework really do 
exist.  But in doing so they divorce the qu estion ‘Do ϕs exist?’  of any discernible 
meaning.’  (Leng, 2010, c.2,  p11)  
This motivation has its roots in a scept icism about the poss ibi l ity of there being a 
disc ipl ine that can further justi fy already internal ly justif ied c laims. Carnap’s 
‘quietist’  conclusion is  to completely abandon the ‘philosophical  question’ of  
whether we should believe cla ims just if ied by internal standards. This is  not the 
conclus ion that the natural ist  wishes to land on, as it  does not a l low for science to 
answer our ontological  question of what exists.  The scept ical  posit ion it  takes 
requires us to abandon these quest ions entirely.  It  is  worth explor ing why Carnap 
reaches this conclusion, and whether the natural ist  has any hope of avoiding it .  
Carnap’s issue with ‘f i rst  philosophy ’ is  the idea of abandoning al l  former beliefs 
and then trying to test each belief to see if  it  can be justi f ied. However,  if  
everything is  abandoned then what do we have left  to put our new beliefs to the 
test? This picture leads to individual  hypotheses tested in isolation against 
foundational beliefs,  but Carnap (and Quine , 1951) believe that only in the 
context of a framework can these hypotheses have any content.  Carnap says that 
it  is  conventions that we adopt that tests our hypotheses. If  they pass t hese tests,  
it  just  shows that they are good against the conventions that we have adopted. As 
a result,  for Carnap,  practical  use does not equal existence or any reason for us to 
believe in any entit ies  posited.  
The important questions of ontology that I  am exploring is  one of these ‘external 
quest ions’ .  For example,  the answer to the internal quest ion, ‘ Is  there a prime 
number between 6 and 8?’ is  ‘Yes,  there is  such a number’  and is  sett led by 
mathematics.  Whereas my posit ion is  to address the external q uestion of whether 
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there is  such a number  and so if  Carnap is  correct then we have no hope of 
answering this.  Try ing to determine what ex ists outs ide of the framework we have 
adopted is  not possible ,  s ince when the hypotheses are taken outside their 
framework they lose their content.  So ,  according to Carnap, only internal 
quest ions can be answered which are only practical  questions,  not quest ions of 
what  exists  outside of  an establ ished practice . Is  there any way for  us to move 
beyond the framework and reach the natural ist  conclusion that what is  posited by 
our best scient if ic  theories is  what we should  bel ieve in outside of  any established 
pract ice? 
Quine’s  (1960) motivation for natural ism should be able to help us do this.  Quine 
thinks that  the pract ical  reasons can serve as evident ial  and as confirmat ion of 
the truth of our  scient if ic  utterances.  He fol lows Carnap’s sceptic ism about testing 
individual  hypotheses outside a framework that gives them content.  But w hilst  
Carnap draws a strong dist inct ion between conventionally adopted rules and 
theoretical  statements,  Quine disagrees:  
‘According to Carnap, there is  a strong dist inction to be drawn between the 
conventionally adopted rules that set up what it  means for  a statement to be 
justi f ied according to the internal standards of justi f ication for a given framework, 
and the theoret ical  statements that are just if ied in the l ight of these 
conventionally adopted rules,  together with empirical  evidence. .  .  Quine's 
response is  just to note that,  i f  there is  a  di f ference here, it  is  a di fference in 
degree rather than character.  In each case, we are putt ing theoretical  c laims to 
empirical  test,  and adopting them to the extent that they contr ibute, within the 
context of a theoret ical  framework, to the eff icient organizat ion of our 
experience.’   (Leng, 2010, c.2,  p13)  
For Quine, we do the same for both the conventional ly adopted rules and the 
theoretical  statements that are justif ied within these adopted rules.  We put them 
to the empirical  test and adopt them if  they are useful in organiz ing and 
explaining our experiences. And so ‘ I f  al l  questions concerning the evidential  
support there is  for  a hypothesis involve an element of practical ity or 
convention…  the fact that a hypo thesis is  adopted on practical  grounds in no way 
speaks against our assumption that we have evidence for its  truth. ’  (Leng, 2010, 
c.2,  p14) This is  how Quine turns Carnap’s ‘negat ive’  conclusion into a ‘posit ive’  
one. We have reason to believe in the entit ies posited by our adopted precise ly 
because we adopt them.  
The question remains :  what if  we had different frameworks? I f  this could be the 
case,  then we are aware that what exists is  contingent on the conventions that we 
have adopted and the frameworks t hat we use. Quine ’s response is  art iculated by 
Leng:  
‘ I f  a l l  quest ions concerning the evidentia l  support there is  for a hypothesis involve 
an element of pract ical ity or convent ion, then, Quine thinks,  the fact that a 
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hypothesis is  adopted on pract ical  grou nds in no way speaks against our 
assumption that we have evidence for its  truth.’  (Leng, 2010, c.2,  p14)  
He just  accepts this could be the case, but that the best we can do is  theorise with 
what we have.  We could f ind evidence that better describes and org anises our 
experience. This would then be justi f ication to adopt this new evidence and then 
our ontological  framework wil l  improve with each improvement we make to our 
frameworks and the theoretical  statements confirmed within them. The reason we 
choose sc ience as the guide for our ontological  commitments is  that it  is  the best 
at refining and improving the explanations we have for our experiences. This 
posit ive conclus ion, which  Quine leads us to  from the scept ical  start  he shares 
with Carnap, lets us reach the naturalist  posit ion we need to help us answer 
ontological  questions.  What is  successful practical ly  is  what we have evidence to 
believe in.  This leads us to a posit ion where the indispensabil ity argument can be 
used as a powerful  argument for the exi stence of mathematical  entit ies ,  as I  wil l  
explain in the next section.  
1.2 The Indispensabil ity Argument  
Although there is  no one source for the current standard vers ion of the 
indispensabi l ity argument ,  it  is  most commonly rooted in ontological  theses 
argued by Quine. The overall  argument can be summed up in the fol lowing  
passage from Putnam: 
‘So far I  have been developing an argument for real ism along roughly the 
fol lowing l ines:  quanti f ication over mathematical  entit ies is  indispensable for 
science, both formal and physical;  therefore we should accept such quant if ication;  
but this commits us to accepting the existence of the mathematical  entit ies in 
quest ion.’  (Putnam, 1971, p374)  
The most standard version of the argument today can be spelled out as fol lows 
(Cowling, 2017):  
‘P1. Ontological naturalism. Our best guides to what exists are our  best scienti f ic  
theories,  so we ought to believe in the ontological  commitments of our best 
scient if ic  theories.  
P2. Quine’s cr iter ion. The ontological  commitments of a theory are al l  and only 
those entit ies that are the values of bound variables occurr ing within that theory.  
P3. Indispensabi l ity .  Our best scientif ic  theories involve indispensable 
quantif icat ion over mathematical  ent it ies .   
P4. Confirmational hol ism. Support for a scientif ic  theory accrues holist ical ly  to al l  
of its  ontological  commitments,  so bel ief in a given scientif ic  theory requires 
belief  in al l  of  its  ontological  commitments.  
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C1. Therefore…  we ought to believe in the existence of mathematical  ent i t ies .’  
(Cowling, 2017, c.1,  p49)  
It  is  c lear to see that i f  the premises are accepted then we are committed to a 
belief  in mathematical  entit ies .  Of course, these premises are not uncontroversia l,  
and issues have been raised for every one of them for diffe rent reasons. I  wil l  not 
discuss further P1, as I  have given reasons above in 1.1 for why I  believe 
natural ism is an acceptable (or best)  avenue to f ind answers for our ontological  
quest ions. Issues may be taken with P2 . A nominalist  could accept P2 and give an 
account of scient if ic  theory that does not have mathematical  entit ies as values of 
bound variables within said theory. It  is  possible,  and it  wil l  arise later,  that some 
nominal ists (namely,  f ict ionalists )  cla im that  they can accept P2 but st i l l  reject C1. 
I  wil l  look into whether this  attempt works or not  in Part 2.  These premises have a 
greater bear ing on the nominal ism vs platonism debate,  s ince undermining either 
of these wil l  undermine C1 and al low the nominalist  to show that we do not have 
a commitment to the existence of mathematical  entit ies.  The nominal ist  re jection 
of P3 is  to say that mathematical  entit ies are not indispensably quantif ied over in 
our best scient if ic  theories.  This undermines C1 , s ince if  mathematical  entit ies are 
no longer indispensable to our best scientif ic  theories ,  then we can dispense with 
them and no longer be committed to the existence of them. P4 can also be 
rejected by a nominalist  who bel ieves that numbers in some form are 
indispensable to our best scient if ic  theories,  but that this indispensabi l ity does 
not command a commitment to the existence of the numbers used in the theory. 
In the fol lowing (1 .3) ,  I  wil l  be looking at  Fie ld’s  (1980) attempt to  reject P3.  (For 
further discussion on issues with the Indispensabil ity Argument see Cowling  
(2017).)  
1.3 Nominal is ing Scientif ic Theory  
I f  it  could be shown that mathematical  ent it ies are not indispensably quanti f ied 
over in our best sc ient if ic  theories ,  then the whole indispensabil ity  arg ument 
would fal l  apart.  Field (1980) attempts to deny P3 and tries to argue that 
mathematical  entit ies are not indispensable to science. He does this by using the 
concept of conservatism .  He argues that mathematical  theories need not be true, 
but only be conservative:   
‘Principle C (for ‘conservative’):  Let A be any nominalist ical ly  statable assertion, 
and N any body of such assert ions;  and let S  be any mathematical  theory. Then A* 
isn’t  a consequence of  N* + S + ‘∃x –  M(x)’  unless A is  a consequence of N  [where 
A* is  any nominalist ical ly  statable assert ion , and N* is  any body of such assertions 
when taken with S] .  
Why should we believe this principle? Wel l,  it  fol lows from a sl ightly stronger 
principle that is  perhaps a bit  more obvious:  
10 
 
Principle C’:  Let  A be any nominalist ical ly -statable assert ion, and N any body of 
such assert ions.  Then A* isn’t  a consequence of N* + S unless it  is  a consequence 
of N* alone.  
This in turn is  equivalent (assuming the underlying logic to be compact) to 
something st i l l  more obvious-sounding:  
Principle C’’:  Let A be any nominalist ical ly -statable assert ion. Then A* isn’t  a 
consequence of S  unless it  is  logical ly  true’ (Field,  1980 p12)  
By ‘conservative’ ,  Fie ld means that adding a  mathematical  theory to a nominal ist ic  
scient if ic  theory does not lead to any conclusions that would not fol low from the 
nominal ist ic  scientif ic  theory alone. He gives  a detai led discuss ion of how the 
inclusion of mathematical  entit ies is  just a conservative extension of an already 
exist ing nominal ist ic  theory. The dif ference between mathematical  entit ies and 
other theoretical  objects that are used in sc ience is ,  according to Field,  that you 
can add the theoret ical  objects to an observed case and derive new conclus ions. 
However,  with mathematic al  ent it ies ,  this is  not the case . The conclusions der ived 
could be done so with nominal ist ic  assumptions. Also,  if  the sc ient if ic  theory is  
underdetermined by the evidence , the inc lusion of mathematical  objects would 
not lead to any further conclusions th at nominalist ic  evidence would not have 
reached alone. All  that mathematics does in science, according to Field’s 
argument of conservat ism, is  act as a shortcut to make it  easier to get to the 
conclus ion that could already be reached using nominal ist ic  the ory  alone. As a 
result ,  his argument a l lows that mathematics can be used in science but it  need 
not be. He explains that the reason that it  is  used is  not because of its  
indispensabi l ity but because the inclusion makes the statement of many scient if ic  
theories much easier and s impler.  The use of mathematics is  s imply a pragmatic 
one rather than a necessary one.  
To actual ly prove this ,  though, F ield needs to show how we would go about 
nominal is ing the best scient if ic  theories.  Of course, it  would be too much  to 
nominal ise al l  currently accepted best sc ient if ic  theories ,  but  applying it  to a few 
would show the method of how to do the rest.  To do this ,  he reparses the theories 
without quanti fying over mathematical  entit ies and attempts to show us that the 
theory parsed is  st i l l  attractive. Newton’s gravitational theory is  the theory he 
uses in his  (1980) to motivate his argument that an attractive nominalisation can 
be done. If  it  can be done effectively to this  physical  theory,  he hopes to motivate 
the view that there is  no reason to assume that this could not be done for the rest 
of science. By doing this,  use of the platonist  versions of scient if ic  theories is  
justi f ied, without commitment to their truth, as they are only conservative 
extensions of  nominal ist i cal ly-statable theories.  So, by nominal is ing this one 
scient if ic  theory ,  F ield hopes to show that his concept of conservat ivism can 
refute the indispensabil ity argument. This is  because by showing that empirical  
theories can be nominalised , he shows that mathematical  objects are not 
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indispensable to our best scient if ic  theories and as a result  the truth of 
mathematical  theories  is  not guaranteed.  
1.3.1 Logical Possibi l ity and Consistency  
One issue that can be raised for F ield’s project is  how to construe  logical  
possibi l ity.  I f  F ield’s notion of conservatism appeals to a semantic notion of 
consequence,  then it  al lows for his notion of logical  possibi l ity to be based in set -
theoretic models .  By adopting set -theoret ic models as the basis of  log ical  
possibi l ity ;  Field’s attempt to demathematise science in itsel f  rel ies on 
mathematical  objects,  the set -theoretic models.  I t  is  c lear to see how this is  a 
problem for Field’s argument.  He no longer has a way of shedding our 
commitments to al l  mathemat ical  objects ,  only those that are conservative 
extensions of  nominal ist ic  theories.  If  his  argument overal l  st i l l  rel ies on the 
existence of mathematical  objects,  then it  cannot be accepted as a nominalist ic  
argument,  s ince it  would  undermine the motivatio n for his  whole project.   
To combat this ,  Field adopts a  pr imitive,  modal notion of logical  possibi l ity that 
does not reduce to set -theoretic model versions of possibi l ity.  Consistency or 
logical  poss ibi l ity does not need to rely on the existence of set -theoretic models 
and so avoids commitment to any mathematical  entit ies.  One reason Fie ld gives to 
accept this is  that the set-theoretical  model account of logical  possibi l ity has 
things the wrong way around  (see Leng (2010,  c.3 p10)).  The way Field explains 
this is  by saying that certain sets would be able to exist  in the set -theoretic model 
or not,  as a result  of the pr imitive modal account of logic .  If  a set  does not exist ,  
then it  is  because it  is  logical ly  impossible to exist  and this is  informed by a mor e 
primit ive modal account of logic.   
Wright and Hale a lso raise a problem for Fie ld’s take on possibi l ity :  
‘The object ion that is  to occupy us arises at this point from the consideration that 
Field’s primit ive operator of possibi l ity is  object- l inguist ic .  It  has to be, of course. 
.  .  But when the operator is  object - l inguist ic ,  Field’s bel ief in the conservativeness 
of,  e.g.,  number theory would appear to commit him to the view that the Peano 
axioms, say,  might have been true as standardly interpreted, and h ence that the 
nonexistence of numbers is  a mere contingency . ’  (Wright and Hale,  1992, p113)  
They argue that F ield’s primit ive notion of possibi l ity leads to a posit ion where 
the existence of numbers is  a contingency. This would not necessari ly  be a 
problem for Field were it  not for their further argument that  attempts to show us 
that ‘The picture of the realm of contingency as comprising such a unif ied web 
seems to go deep enough in our ordinary thinking to ensure that i t  wil l  be very 
diff icult  to vindicate  the concept ion of mathematical  objects  as strongly 
contingent merely by description of anything we already f ind intuit ive.’  (Wright 
and Hale,  1992, p134) If  their argument holds ,  then Fie ld’s argument leads to a 
posit ion where the existence of numbers is  contingent but that this contingency 
does not compare at a l l  to our usual not ion of contingencies.  So it  seems Field’s 
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conception requires further argument to show how this conclus ion can be 
resolved.  
A further issue for F ie ld  is  raised by Leng:  
‘But one might st i l l  object that to c laim, of a  theory,  that it  is  consistent wi l l  
embroil  F ield in some nominal ist ical ly  unacceptable machinery however he 
proposes to interpret this c laim, even if  it  is  not interpreted as a c laim about set‐
theoretic models .  For,  however we choose to understand the notion of logical  
possibi l ity,  surely the mere assertion of a theory that it  is  consistent ( logical ly  
possible) involves us in a claim about at least one abstract object —a theory?’ 
(Leng, 2010, c.3 p10) 
Field’s account throughout makes use of  discussions of theories .  The issue that 
then arises is  that the theories themselves that he is  discussing are abstract 
objects.  If  this is  the case ,  then even i f  he manages to rid us of our commitments 
to the existence of  mat hematical  objects,  he would fai l  to reach a completely 
nominal ist ic  conclusion , s ince his argument commits us to the existence of 
theories.  
To resist  this charge , Field gives a deflat ionary account of theories ,  where ax ioms, 
when stated to be true, just st ate something that one says direct ly when one 
utters the sentence to  state the ax iom. Discussions of theories being true are just 
inf lated ways of expressing, in our object language, the ax ioms of our theory. This  
account applies to logical  possibi l ity as wel l ,  so that ta lk of them as substantia l  is  
avoided entire ly.  They are def lated down to object -level assert ions.  
Unfortunately for F ield,  this deflat ionary account faces another problem. Even if  
they can be stated by using a def lationist  object level acc ount of theory and 
logical  poss ibi l ity ,  how is it  that mathematics helps  in justi fying beliefs? By 
ascending to a mathematical  level ,  even more (nominalist ical ly  acceptable) claims 
can be deduced than the nominalist ic  assumptions that we start  with. Despit e 
this,  Fie ld is  only really interested in arguing that mathematics needs to be 
dispensable to formulating our best sc ienti f ic  theories;  the role of  mathematics 
and what conclus ions can be drawn from their use is  somewhat i rrelevant to this .  
So,  Fie ld can st i l l  get away with arguing against indispensabi l ity but it  is  not very 
comforting for nominalists who wish to be confident in the conclusions that are 
drawn from the use of  mathematics in sc ient if ic  theory.  
1.3.2 Nominalis ing Other Scientif ic Theories  
Whilst  Fie ld manages to present a  nominalist ical ly  acceptable vers ion of 
Newtonian gravitat ional theory,  he may f ind issues with f inding genuinely 
nominal ist ic  alternatives to other scientif ic  theories.  Fie ld’s example of 
Newtonian gravitat ional theory quant if ies over space-t ime points and regions of 
space-t ime points:  
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‘talk of such objects as space‐time points and regions might be thought to be at 
least as problematic for a nominalist  as talk  of points and arbitrary sets of points 
in ℝ .  For one thing, in  Fie ld's  nominalist ic  theory space‐time points are held to 
have precisely the same structure as ℝ .  I f  F ield's nominal izat ion s imply builds a l l  
the structure of the mathematical  theory of ℝ  into physical  space,  can he real ly be 
said to have dispensed with mathe matics?’  (Leng, 2010, c.3 p15) 
However,  even if  Field’s space -t ime points satisfy the same axioms as 
mathematical  theory,  as long as he does not  quanti fy over mathematical  ent it ies ,  
there should be no objection to his reparsed theory from a nominalist ic  
standpoint.  The space -time points themselves should be more acceptable to 
nominal ists ,  s ince Fie ld dist inguishes  them from abstract objects by pointing out 
that our knowledge of  them is an empir ical  matter.  Quanti fying over regions of 
space-t ime points may  also seem problematic at f irst  but it  is  poss ible to 
understand this as quantify ing over arbitrary merelogical  sums of space -t ime 
points that are located where the ir parts are located. As they are located, it  
seems these regions a lso dif fer from abstract objects that are usually taken not  to 
have a spatiotemporal  location. So, overal l ,  Field’s nominal isat ion of Newtonian 
gravitat ional theory does not raise any fatal  p roblems for  Fie ld’s project.  
The main issue for F ie ld is  that many scienti f ic  theories are not very similar to 
Newtonian gravitat ional theory.  For example, Newtonian gravitat ional theory 
relates space-time points,  and Field just reduces the mathematics wit h non-
mathematical ly  def ined properties that are instead def ined in terms of 
comparative predicates  or relat ions. Fie ld fo l lows on from Hilbert’s axiomatization 
of geometry (1971),  who by us ing concepts such as point,  betweenness and 
congruence was able to  provide a synthet ic formulation of geometry. From this 
system, Hilbert was able to prove a representation theorem, one that l inked the 
platonist  system of geometry with his own nominalist ic  version. Field’s aim was to 
move what Hilbert did for space and a pply it  to space-t ime. In order to do this ,  he 
needed to formulate Newtonian laws with equivalent comparative predicates.  And 
by doing so Field is  able to nominal ise Newtonian gravitational theory.  He sums 
this up in the fol lowing:  
‘we want to come up with  a system of ‘ intr insic’  axioms, more or less analogous to 
Hilbert’s but  involving somewhat dif ferent concepts,  and to come up with a 
representation theorem that explains the legit imacy of coordinatizing space -t ime 
and a uniqueness theorem that explains wh y in the coordinatized treatment of 
space-t ime the laws of Newtonian mechanics wil l  be invariant under just the 
coordinate transformations that they are in face invariant under. ’  (Field,  1980, 
p51) 
But some of the mathematics used in other theories cannot just be replaced in 
this way. An example of this can be seen in scient if ic  theories such as phase space 
theories (see Malament (1982)).  The theory  is  a general theory that represents a l l  
possible states  of part icles.  It  is  not as simple in such theories to  replace the 
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mathematics with non -mathematically  defined properties ,  as in doing so we wi l l  
have to accept commitment to believing in the possible states that are 
represented in the mathematical  theory that  we are replacing. Quantifying over 
collections of  possible  states would not be the posit ion that F ield would l ike to 
end up in and it  undermines the motivation to dispense with commitments to 
mathematical  objects in the f irst  place i f  we just replace that commitment to a 
commitment to a collection of pos s ible states.  For nominal ists as a  whole,  this 
would be problematic  only if  possibi l ity were understood in terms of abstract 
objects or if  they were only committed to actual objects only.  I f  the nominalist  
were happy to accept  possible states  as real ,  non -actual states ,  then they could 
avoid this .  However,  a  further argument would need to be made for this .  So, i f  we 
approach nominal is ing theories such as these in the same way that Field 
approaches nominal is ing Newtonian gravitat ional theory ,  it  does not look l ike we 
wil l  reach a desired conclusion. However,  whilst  being very daunting, it  is  not 
inconceivable that someday it  may be poss ible to nominalise even theories such as 
these. So it  is  t rue that none of these problems raised for F ield’s project of 
shedding our commitment to mathematical  objects is  conclusive. They do show, 
however,  that any further attempt to cont inue Fie ld’s project wil l  require 
supremely hard work. It  is  not conclusive one way or another whether this can be 
done; it  is  contingent on whether anyone can show it  is  poss ible.  This has not 
been done and, at this  stage, it  is  not convincing that al l  scientif ic  theories would 
be able to be completely nominal ised in such a way that we are not committed to 
any objects that nominalists f ind questionable. As a result  of this ,  the 
indispensabi l ity premise of the  indispensabil ity argument has not been shown to 
be false.  If  the nominalist  has any hope of undermining C1 , they wil l  have to look 
for issues elsewhere.  
1.4 Issues for  Confirmational Holism  
Another point  of contention in the indispensabi l ity argument is  P 4. As in 1.2 ,  I  
argued that P3 should not be rejected. I  shall  now look at nominal ist  attempts to 
refute P4 and undermine C1. P4 states that acceptance of a sc ienti f ic  theory 
commits us to believing in al l  entit ies posited in a theory. So,  i f  an accepted 
theory posits the existence of electrons,  for example, we are committed to 
believing in their ex istence because they are posited in our accepted theory. It  is  
c lear to see how this premise can be problematic for nominalists.  If  it  is  the case 
that mathematical  ent it ies are indispensable  to our best sc ient if ic  theories,  then 
it  is  P4 that  ensures our commitment to believing in their ex istence. This fol lows 
from the naturalism we have started with.  
Our starting point for answering ontological  quest ions explain ed in 1.1 seems to 
require us to accept P4. Is  it  possible to re ject P4 on a natural ist ic  basis? To do so 
would surely somehow drive a wedge between  bel ieving our accepted theory,  and 
believing in that thing. If  we do this,  then we would end up fal l ing int o Carnap’s 
sceptical  conclus ion. This may not be the case,  however,  because i f  we remember 
that the naturalism foundation we are assuming requires us to look no further 
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than scient if ic  practice to answer our ontological  quest ions,  we do not necessar i ly  
have to accept P4 if  it  contrasts with our accepted best scienti f ic  practices.  In the 
fol lowing, I  wil l  look at a couple of ways this  contrast between P4 and our best 
scient if ic  practices can be shown ,  such as the use of idealisations and scientists ’  
agnost ic ism towards entit ies  that we do not have any direct evidence for.  I  wi l l  
discuss whether these are genuine cases of P4 clashing with our naturalist ic  
framework, because i f  they are then the nominalist  can dispense with it  and 
completely undermine C1.  
1.4.1 Mathematics ’  Special  Posit ion in  Science  
It  has  been stated that the role of mathematics in science sets it  apart ,  and that 
the special  posit ion it  possesses dist inguishes it  from other objects  confirmed by 
the success of our best scient if ic  theories .  
Sober (1993) raises an interest ing point  that  because mathematics  is  included in 
al l  of our scientif ic  theories,  both the accepted and the unaccepted ones,  they 
cannot be the entit ies  that partic ipate in the truth of the accepted scientif ic  
theories.  If  they did,  then they would not be included in our unaccepted sc ient if ic  
theories,  e ither .  Further to this ,  the mathematical  entit ies and statements used in 
both accepted and unaccepted theories are often the same mathematical  
statements,  so it  is  not even that some mathematical  ent it ies are confirmed by 
some accepted sc ienti f ic  theories and not others.  This prevents the objection to 
Sober that accepted mathematical  statements can be conf irmed against other,  
unaccepted mathematical  statements.  Doing so would be unhelpful anyway, as 
this does not conf irm the mathematics themselves .  According to Sober,  the issue 
is  that  there is  no way of confirming them in the same way we confirm other 
posited objects included in our best scienti f ic  theories.  But is  there a way of  
empirical ly  test ing mathematical  statements  in such a way that  they lose this 
specia l  posit ion? Leng writes :  
‘Sober considers the possibi l ity of confirming the mathematical  hypothesis that ‘2 
+ 2 = 4’  as opposed to al l  the alternat ive hypotheses,  ‘2 + 2 =  n’,  by count ing four 
apples,  f irst  as two pairs,  and then as four.  ‘2 + 2 = 4’  is  indeed a hypothesis about 
mathematical  objects,  the natural numbers,  which, in  the l ight of various 
assumptions about how to determine the cardinal it ies of sets of physical  objects 
by count ing wil l  have implicat ions for the result  of the counting experiment .…  
[A] lthough this  appears to meet Sober's criterion for a genuine contrast ive 
experiment,  Sober argues … that we do not really put the mathematical  hypothesis 
to the test in  such cases. The reason Sober gives for this is  that,  i f  somehow we 
counted the apples and ended up counting three rather than four,  we would not 
consider the hypothesis 2 + 2 = 3 as receiv ing conf irmation (and thus consider the 
experiment as disconf irming the hypothesis that 2 + 2 = 4),  but would rather look 
to some mistake elsewhere in our assumptions about the nature of the 
experiment. But if  we never consider the recalcitrant evidence as disconfirmat ion 
of the pure mathematical  hypothesis,  and only as  disconf irmation of the br idging 
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assumptions that a l low us to apply that hypothesis,  then we cannot,  Sober thinks,  
see such experiments as confirming their mathematical  hypotheses when they do 
succeed.’  (Leng, 2010,  c.5 p6-7)  
Mathematics ,  then, is  not being tested in the same way that other  existents are 
tested in science and so their existence cannot be conf irmed in this way. If  it  is  
not the case that empirical  evidence can disconfirm their existence , then the same 
empirical  evidence is  not able to confir m their existence, because no matter the 
outcome of the empirical  test ,  it  seems that  mathematical  entit ies wil l  a lways be 
confirmed,  as any issues in the testing would never be pointed toward 
mathematical  entit ies (or their lack of ex istence) but always p ointed elsewhere. I t  
is  c lear to see Sober’s objection:  mathematics is  held in a special  posit ion where it  
is  not tested in the same way as other posits in our best scientif ic  theories.  As a 
result  of this,  mathematical  entit ies that are posited in our the ories cannot 
receive confirmation in the same way that other existents do. Thus,  mathematical  
objects are not covered in P4, their ex istence is  not conf irmed by the success or 
acceptance of our best scient if ic  theory,  and so P4 fai ls  to do the work it  need s to 
in order to reach C1.  
Indispensabi l ity theorists would not accept these conclusions.  The objection that 
mathematics’  specia l  posit ion prevents it  f rom being confirmed does not hold .  
This is  because the indispensabi l ity theorist ,  in l ight of  evidence against the 
requirement of using certain mathematical  statements,  would be more than happy 
to drop any commitment to their existence. Along the same l ines,  if  evidence were 
to stack up against mathematics’  indispensabil ity ,  then the indispensabil i ty 
theorist  would have no problem dropping commitment to their existence 
completely.  Mathematics is  tested in this way and although there has not yet been 
an example of  evidence stacking up against the use of mathematics ,  we can 
conceive of this s ituat ion  and so mathematics can be conf irmed or denied in this 
way. Colyvan writes:  
‘Suppose that Hartry F ield has completed the nominal isation of Newtonian 
mechanics but that  he and his successors repeatedly fai l  to nominalise general 
relativity .  Let's  also suppo se that this fai lure gives us  good reason to bel ieve that 
general relativity cannot be nominalised. From this we conclude that 
mathematical  entit ies are indispensable to general relat ivity,  but not to 
Newtonian mechanics .  In this sett ing,  then, can we imag ine an experiment to test 
the hypothesis that there are natural numbers? The answer is  yes.  Not only can 
we imagine such an experiment,  we can perform it .  In  fact many such experiments  
have been performed over the last 80 years or so,  for any experiment th at 
confirms general re lat ivity over Newtonian mechanics is  such an experiment. In 
particular,  the 1919 Eddington ecl ipse experiment is  such an experiment.’  
(Colyvan, 2001, p123–124) 
But scientists themselves do not act in this way and are not test ing mathe matics 
in the way Colyvan discusses above. So does this go against,  once again,  the 
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natural ist  desire to fol low scienti f ic  practices in order to answer our questions of 
ontology? Scientists ,  as a whole,  are f ine to use whatever mathematics they need 
to in order to prove a hypothesis and so are not concerned about testing the 
mathematics being used against a sparser mathematics,  or against  a nominalist ic  
version of the theory. However,  this could just be put down to a division of 
labour. There are those who use mathematics in their scientif ic  practices to prove 
a hypothesis and then there are mathematic ians who spend t ime reducing the 
required mathematics to reach the proof.  So  even if  sc ient ists themselves do not 
compare and test mathematics in this way, our  best scient if ic  theories are 
constant ly evaluated and improved by comparing and testing the mathematics 
used against sparser mathematics  by some mathematicians ,  and, as such, the 
confirmation of several mathematical  statements and entit ies is  lost because  of 
this test ing. The supposed special  posit ion of mathematics ,  then,  does not prevent 
it  from being confirmed via test ing in the way Sober wishes . Thus,  P4 has not been 
shown not to hold for the case of mathematical  ent it ies,  and thus there is  no 
reason to think the ex istence of the mathematical  entit ies employed in the 
expression of those theories is  not confirmed in the confirmat ion of those 
theories.  
1.4.2 Direct Evidence  
Another way that P4 might be thought to go against our scientif ic  pract ices is  that  
scient ists themselves are agnostic towards the existence of objects unt i l  they have 
further evidence:  mere inclusion in our best  scient if ic  theories is  not enough for 
them; so P4 seemingly  goes against  our naturalist  foundat ions. Leng writes:  
‘There are cases where our theories indispensably posit  objects of  a part icular 
sort,  but where sc ient ists hold back from accepting the existence of such objects 
unti l  they have some more direct evidence of their ex istence. Maddy's example is  
of atomic theory,  cir ca 1900: although this successful theory indispensably posited 
the existence of atoms, it  was only when Jean Perrin's Brownian motion 
experiments provided some more direct evidence of the ex istence of such objects 
that many sc ient ists became convinced of t heir reality.  Similar behaviour can be 
found amongst modern scientists:  c loud chambers and partic le accelerators are 
constructed in order to detect,  and thereby confirm, the existence of the 
subatomic part icles posited by our theories,  even though the assu mption that 
there are such partic les already appears indispensable to those theories.  It  seems, 
then, that indispensable occurrence in a successful theory isn't  always enough to 
convince sc ient ists that they have reason to  believe in the objects  posited by  our 
theories.  In at least some cases,  a more direct kind of evidence is  required.’  (Leng, 
2010, c.5,  p24)  
Indispensabi l ity and inclusion in our best sc ienti f ic  theories is  not  enough for 
scient ists to be convinced of an entit y’s  existence. As a result ,  P4  seems to go 
against sc ient if ic  practice and as such goes against the naturalist  foundation of 
the indispensabil i ty argument. Direct evidence seems important too. So ,  for 
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example, a lepton-l ike  hypothesis is  preferred to a no - lepton hypothesis because 
without the inclusion of leptons we are left  without an explanation for the events 
that occur in  cloud chambers. This at f i rst  seems to suggest the idea of direct 
evidence requiring a causal element. But given our concern is  about acausal  
mathematical  objects,  to define direct evidence in this way would be question 
begging. The causal  story is  important for leptons,  as explanatory power of cloud 
chambers is  lost without their existence. Whether direct evidence is  causal or not ,  
the most important point to take away is  that direct evidence is  another example 
of how being indispensable is  not the f inal justif icat ion for existence for 
scient ists.  The difference between mathematical  entit ies and other posits in 
scient if ic  theories could be considered here.  The fact that we are able to test for  
direct evidence of leptons us ing cloud chambers means that ,  without that direct 
evidence, it  may make sense for scient ists to hold back from commitment to their 
existence. However,  scientists do not seem to be agnostic about ma thematical  
entit ies in this  way. As stated in 1.3 .1 ,  they are happy to use any mathematical  
entit ies  needed to reach their conclus ion. It  is  poss ible that because mathematical  
entit ies di ffer in k ind to concrete entit ies,  they are conf irmed in different wa ys. 
As a result,  I  do not believe the example of agnost icism and direct  evidence is  
enough to completely refute P4 for mathematical  entit ies and as a result  C1 st i l l  
holds.  
1.4.3 Ideal isat ions  
Another way that P4  might be thought to  go against our common scient if ic  
pract ice is  in the use of ideal isat ions. Sc ientists often make use of idealisations to 
help come to successful sc ienti f ic  conclusion. They momentari ly  take for granted 
the truth of statements they know independently to be false . Leng writes :  
‘Many of our actual sc ienti f ic  theories do not consist  of bodies  of straightforward 
truths about ordinary objects,  but rather inc lude hypotheses that,  i f  interpreted 
as assumptions about  such objects,  are explicit ly  known to be fa lse. Thus,  for 
example, in our  theoretical  account of the trajectories of project i les,  for ease of 
calculation we may assume, as is  known to be false,  that air  resistance is  not a 
factor.  In account ing for economic trends in societies we may assume, as is  surely 
false,  that individual agents are ful ly  rational uti l ity maximizers.  And in order to 
have a tractable theory of the dynamic behaviour of f luids,  we may assume, as is  
known to be fa lse,  that f luids are cont inuous substances. …  I f  we apply our 
ideal iz ing assumptions to actual proje ct i les,  economies,  f lu ids,  etc .,  we are able to 
get on reasonably well ,  making good predictions about aspects of the behaviour of 
each. And given that a  degree of fals if ication can st i l l  lead to successful 
theoretical  predict ions (and might even be necessa ry in order to make any 
predictions),  it  may indeed be rational for us to adopt such l iteral ly  false 
hypotheses in the context of our theorizing,  even though we do not believe those 
hypotheses.’  (Leng, 2010, c.5,  p13 -14)  
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These fa lse hypotheses can and do l ead to successful theoretical  predictions and 
so whilst  it  is  rational to adopt them for our theorising ,  we do actually  have 
independent evidence that they are in fact  false. As we know these hypotheses to 
be false independently of our theoris ing,  i t  canno t be the case that the 
acceptance of the theories they are part of confirms the truth of the hypotheses. 
So it  is  possible for us  to have hypotheses that are used in successful theories that 
are not conf irmed by their part icipation. I f  this is  the case for  not having a ir  
resistance, fr ict ionless surfaces and treating l iquids as cont inuous ,  then surely the 
same could be said of  our mathematical  theories.  Mathematical  statements used 
in our accepted sc ient if ic  theories could have the same status  as these 
ideal isat ions,  so that their part icipation in the successful theory does not commit 
us to bel ieving in them.  
It  could be said,  though, that these idealisat ions are not fa lse assumptions about 
real things.  The hypothesis about l iquids being cont inuous is  not a  false 
assumption about actual physical  l iquids,  but just assumptions about their 
behaviour on a macro - level.  They are actual ly true assumptions about the nature 
of ideal  f luids,  which would be abstract objects themselves. The existence of such 
abstract objects are then posited by our use of them in theories,  and are 
confirmed in the same way, just l ike the indispensabi l ity argument concludes for 
mathematical  objects.  This would refute the objection and actually turn it  against 
the nominalist  by al lowing fo r the confirmat ion for even more abstract objects .  So 
instead of undermining P4, this objection could be strengthening the platonist  
posit ion by adding more abstract objects to the l ist  conf irmed by our best 
scient if ic  theories.   
Quine would not be happy w ith this move. For Quine, we often use abbreviations 
and idealisations in our best scientif ic  theories.  These also do in fact help us reach 
successful predict ions about the real  world and so are very useful  because of this.  
But Quine does not take this to confirm the existence of these idealisat ions,  
precise ly because they are el iminable and what is  said with them could also be 
said in a way that does not quant ify over them  (see, for example,  Quine, 1960, 
p249).  They are just  convenient myths that we are able to use without being 
committed to their existence because we are able to st i l l  reach the same scient if ic  
theories without use of them. What is  real ly asserted in use of these idealisat ions,  
such as fr ict ionless planes and lack of a ir  resistance, is  th e behaviour of objects 
when the variable (such as fr ict ion or a ir  resistance) approaches 0. P4 survives ,  
then, because the success of our theories confirms the existence of posited 
objects in our best formulated theories ( i .e .  those that are left  when al l  
el iminable assumptions are done away with) .  So , again,  mathematical  ent it ies 
have not been shown not to be  conf irmed in accordance with  P4 because they 
remain indispensable to our best sc ient if ic  theories.   
I f  this is  the case for Quine , then he may need to commit himself  to more abstract 
objects than he hopes for.  Leng suggests that Quine’s reason for a l lowing these 
ideal isat ions to be e l iminable is  that they are just cases of var iables approaching 0  
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(See Leng, 2010, c4,  p19) .  However,  other idealisat ions are not of this form. Fluids 
being cont inuous,  for  example,  are not a matter of the distance between part icles 
in a l iquid approaching zero.  The l iquid would become more solid in this case. So 
the idealisation of l iquid being continuous is  dif ferent  in typ e to l imit  myths,  
where the idealisat ion is  s imply an example of the variable approaching zero (See 
Leng, 2010, c4,  p20) .  I f  this  is  the case, then l iquids being continuous may be an 
essentia l  ideal isat ion that cannot be el iminated for the same reason as o ther 
ideal isat ions,  s ince we currently have no bel ieved account of ordinary f luids that 
does the job of continuous f luids in theoris ing.  Because of this ,  i t  seems l ike 
continuous f luids may be confirmed by their inclusion in our best scienti f ic  
theories.  
Is  there any hope for the nominalist  to argue against this and refute P4? One 
answer may be in the fol lowing:  
‘According to Quine, speaking f igurat ively as  if  there are point masses can serve 
the theoretical  purpose of representing the behaviour of extended  massive 
objects as being thus and so, regardless of whether there really are any point 
masses. …[G] iven their s imilarit ies,  we might wonder whether the uti l ity of 
postulating cont inuous ideal f luids is  more l ike the ut i l ity of postulating point 
masses than the uti l ity of postulat ing (say)  electrons. Here too, we might think,  
we should see ourselves as speaking merely f igurat ively,  and not l i teral ly,  when 
we adopt the hypothesis that there are such things,  in order to take advantage of 
the representat ional value of that hypothesis in a l lowing us to paint a picture of 
how things are with real f luids. ’  (Leng, 2010, c.5,  p22)  
The nominalist ’s  hope ,  then,  rel ies on saying that our use of these ideal isat ions 
are f igurative uses and not to be taken l iteral ly.  The nominalist  hopes that ,  
because of  this ,  P4 fai ls ;  s ince,  i f  by using fa lse hypotheses f igurat ively,  then 
there is  no reason why they have to be conf irmed by the success of the theory 
they are used in.  And the hope then is  that mathematical  statements can b e used 
in the same figurative way that ideal isat ions are. When using mathematical  
statements in our best scient if ic  theories ,  we are simply acting as if  they exist ,  in 
order to reach our predictions . This posit ion is  often known as Mathematical  
Fict ional ism and, because of this ,  we are not  committed to the existence of the 
objects posited.  Or so the argument goes.  
Fortunately for the indispensabi l ity theorist ,  there is  no reason to  agree with 
Quine that essential  idealisations cannot be the case.  As a  result  of this,  they 
need not accept the route to f ict ionalism. Indispensabil ity theorists as a whole 
should have no problem accepting that  it  is  possible that l iquids  could exist  in a 
way that they are continuous . So there is  no reason for the indispensabi l ity 
theorist  to abandon this idea for f igurative uses. It  could be the case that there is  
a world where l iquids  are continuous . In this  case,  our talk of these ideal isat ions 
is  not just representat ions  of non-exist ing objects  (the f ict ionalist  posit ion) ,  but 
referring to the exist ing ideal isat ions . Quine may not wish to accept this 
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conclus ion but that is  no reason for any other indispensabi l ity theorist  to reject 
this explanation via possibi l ity  or abstract objects .  Just l ike mathematical  objects,  
the indispensabil i ty theorist  can accept the existence of essential  ideal isat ions 
unti l  such a t ime they are el iminable from our best scientif ic  theories and at  that 
t ime we would no longer be committed to their ex istence ,  and instead only 
committed to the objects that are indispensable to our best theories .   
In order to undermine C1, the nominalist  must motivate the posit ion of f igurative 
speech. This posit ion is  that our scientif ic  discuss ion of ideal isations and 
mathematical  statements should  only be taken to be talk  of what would be the 
case if  they did exist,  because they in fact  do not.  If  they are able to motivate this 
posit ion they would be able to undermine C1, not by showing that  mathematical  
entit ies are dispensable  to science, but that  their inc lus ion in our best theories 
does not require their  existence. Unfortunately,  it  may be problematic for 
ideal isat ions and mathematical  statements to be conceived of as f igurat ive. The 
nominal ist  in this case st i l l  needs to exp lain where the content of these 
statements comes from, and if  taken as a f ict ion, they need to explain what 
exactly gives the f ict ion its content.  I  wi l l  be discussing this posit ion in more 
depth in part 2,  but at  this stage it  does not seem convincing tha t P4 and 
conformational hol ism can be disposed of completely,  without f irst  giving a reason 
to prefer idealisat ions to be used f iguratively over their existence,  independent ly 
of any nominalist ic  justif icat ion. If  this  can be done, the nominalist  must also  
explain where their f igurative uses der ives i ts content.  In the next  section , I  wil l  
be explor ing the ways nominal ists have tried to use f ict ion to remove our 
commitment to the existence of abstract objects .  I  wil l  look at the importance of 
theories of f ict ion for these nominalists.  I  wi l l  look at ser ious attempts to explain 
mathematic statements as make -believe games, and whether they are able to 
motivate the posit ion and explain where the content comes from. If  successful,  
they would successfully undermi ne our commitments to mathematical  entit ies,  but 
I  wil l  conclude that they fai l  to do so.  
Part 2 Fictionalism 
In this part,  I  wi l l  investigate  mathematical  f ict ionalism as an avenue for 
nominal ists to take  to undermine the existence of mathematical  objects .  Init ial ly ,  
I  wil l  outl ine the f ict ionalist  posit ion and discuss the motivations for the posit ion. 
I  wil l  then discuss how some fict ional ists attempt to remove the need for a theory 
of f ict ion and wil l  show why this ult imately leaves their posit ion unconv incing. 
After showing that f ict ion should be involved in any f ict ionalist  account,  I  wil l  look 
at the ways f ict ion and mathematics has been compared and whether this has any 
impact on the ontological  quest ion of the ex istence of mathematical  objects .  I  wil l  
point to how some similarit ies discussed between the two do not shed any l ight on 
the ontological  quest ion, but  then move on to how some f ict ional ists use a 
f ict ional framework to explain the appl ication of mathematics to scienti f ic  theory. 
I  wil l  ask whether such a f ict ional framework can correct ly explain why some 
mathematical  theory is  taken to be correct whilst  others are taken to be inc orrect .  
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I  wil l  give some time to Yablo’s  (2005) attempt to begin an understanding of this,  
although the response is  not ful ly  f leshed out.  I  wi l l  f inally  raise an issue of how 
the representat ional a ids used in the f ict ionalist  framework gets any content,  a s it  
seems their framework rel ies on the f ict ion generat ing its  own content.  This is  not 
generally how fict ion work s and so without a supporting theory of  f ict ion that 
explains this ,  I  wi l l  conclude that the f ict ionalist  framework does not succeed in 
explaining away the existence of abstract objects .  
 
2.1 What is  Fict ionalism?  
One way of character ising f ict ionalism is in the fol lowing:  
‘What characterises a f ict ionalist  approach to subject matter  X is  the suggest ion 
that X can be understood by appeal to the  notion of f ict ion. Otherwise, 
f ict ionalism does not deserve its name. Something about the features of f ict ion 
leads f ict ional ists to think that it  provides a  model for engaging in a way of talking 
about X without incurring the commitments  of a real ist  app roach to X.’  (Bourne & 
Caddick Bourne, 2018a).  
Mathematical  f ict ionalism , then, is  the c laim that mathematics ,  mathematical  
objects and statements,  can be understood by appeal ing to the notion of f ict ion. 
The f ict ionalist  takes f ict ion to have certain feat ures that al lows them to engage 
with mathematical  statements without having any commitment to the existence of 
the objects seemingly referred to.  
Burgess (2004, p18) explains this in another way by dividing nominalism in the 
fol lowing way:  ‘my colleague G ideon Rosen and I  d ist inguished a negat ive or 
destructive side of nominalism, which tel ls  us not to believe what  mathematics 
appears to say,  from a posit ive or reconstructive side,  which aims to give us 
something e lse to bel ieve instead.’  It  is  c lear the r econstructive side points to 
nominal ists ,  such as Field,  who tried to refute platonism by showing how 
mathematical  statements could be reduced to nominalist  statements,  and put 
considerable work into showing how this could be done. Burgess goes on to say,  ‘ i f  
nothing else was clear  from the work of Hartry Field,  Charles Chihara,  Geoffrey 
Hellman, and other  reconstruct ive nominalists whose work we surveyed, it  was 
clear that the amount of honest toi l  that would be required for a nominal ist ic  
reconstrual or reconstruction of mathematics would be quite considerable’  and so 
‘almost everything that has come forth since from the nominalist  camp has 
represented the l ight - f ingered larcenous var iety,  which helps itsel f  to the ut i l ity 
of mathematics,  while  refusing to  pay the pr ice either of acknowledging that what 
mathematics appears to say is  true, or of providing any reconstrual or 
reconstruction that would make it  t rue. The usual label for this variety of 
nominal ism is '[mathematical]  f ict ional ism'.’   
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So mathematical  f ict ionalism is the idea that  mathematical  statements can st i l l  be 
useful in the way they are commonly taken to be by platonists,  but  that they are 
not true, and the objects seemingly referred to do not exist.  The f ict ional ist ’s 
hope to use features of f ict ion to show why mathematical  statements can be 
useful but false,  and that we can continue to apply them in the ways we do now 
without being committed to the existence of the content of the statements,  i .e.  
mathematical  objects.   
So f ict ional ists now overcome what Burgess cal ls  the ‘reconstructive side’ of 
f ict ionalism by not having to bother themselves with the diff icult ies of creating 
concrete versions of mathematical  statements.  Added to this,  their conclus ion 
does not fa l l  to another platonist  obj ection as they agree with the platonist  
argument for applicabil ity of mathematics other than believing that this  entails  
the existence of mathematical  objects.  Al l  p latonists who take issue with 
reconstructive nominalism because it  disagrees with how mathe matical  
statements are used correctly in  scientif ic  theory cannot raise that issue with 
f ict ionalism. Yablo (200 5) explains:   
‘Where the standard l ine offers l itt le other  than truth to explain usefulness,  Fie ld 
lays great stress on the notion that mathemat ical  theories are conservative  over 
nominal ist ic  ones,  i .e. ,  any nominal ist ic  conclus ions that can be proved with 
mathematics can also be proven (albeit  often much less eas i ly)  without it .  The 
uti l ity of mathematics  l ies in the no -r isk deductive ass istance  that it  provides to 
the beleaguered theorist  …  This leaves more or less untouched, however,  the 
problem of how mathematics does  manage to be useful without being true. It  is  
not as though it  benef its only pract it ioners of Field’s qualitat ive science ( it  d oes 
not benef it  F ield-style  scient ists at al l ;  there aren’t  any) .  The people whose 
activit ies we are trying to understand are practicing regular o ld platonic sc ience.’  
(Yablo,  2005, p 91).  
Fict ional ism does not face this issue.  Fict ionalists agree with pla tonists about the 
usefulness of mathematics to science and so  can explain the activit ies of the 
people pract icing regular old platonic science. By comparing mathematics to 
f ict ion, the f ict ional ist  hopes to continue using mathematics in sc ientif ic  practice  
but without having any commitment to the content of the mathematical  
statements,  as they take it  we have no commitment to the content of f ict ional 
statements.  For f ict ionalists to hold their theory in this regard , they must ful ly  
explain how mathematical  statements are l ike f ict ional statements,  so that we can 
accept the usefulness of the statements without accepting any commitment to the 
statement ’s content.  In the fol lowing , I  wil l  look at  the different ways 
mathematics and f ict ion are compared, and I  wi l l  see if  the f ict ionalist  theory has 
a way of getting to their desired aim.  
2.2 The role of Fict ion in  F ict ional ism 
Given the label  ‘f ict ionalism ’ ,  one would take it  that a theory of f ict ion would be 
important for the f ict ionalist .  But s ome fict ionalists  deny the need to have a 
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supporting theory of f ict ion . They claim that  as they are not attempting to 
compare mathematics and f ict ion  ful ly ,  they are only comparing them in sofar that 
the statements  in both are untrue because the objects referred to in the 
statements do not ex ist.  As Balaguer (2009 , p135-136) says:   
‘As I  have deﬁned the view here, mathematical  ﬁctionalism is a view about 
mathematics only;  in particular,  it  is  the view that  
( i)  p latonists are right  that mathematical  sentences l ike ‘4 is  even ’ should be read 
as being about (or purporting to be about) abstract objects;  but  
( i i )  there are no such things as abstract objects (e.g.,  there is  no such thing as the 
number 4);  and so  
( i i i )  sentences l ike ‘4 is  even’ are not l iteral ly  true.  
That’s it .  I t  does not say anything at a l l  about ﬁctional discourse, and so it  is  not 
committed to the claim that there are no important disanalogies  between 
mathematics and ﬁct ion. ’  
Even these f ict ionalists ( if  they can be called that)  face trouble from some issues. 
For example, they would need to explain what makes mathematical  statements 
correct and incorrect in the real world. One response  from Balaguer (2009) is  that:   
‘ In order to respond to this object ion, ﬁct ionalists need a dif ferent theory of what 
the story o f  mathematics consists in.  The ﬁct ional ist  v iew I  want to  develop is  
based on the fol lowing cla im:  
The story of mathematics consists in the cla im that there actual ly exist  abstract 
mathematical  objects of the kinds that platonists have in mind — i .e.,  the k inds 
that our mathematical  theories are about,  or at least  purport to be about.  
This view gives r ise to a corresponding v iew of ﬁctional ist ic  mathematical  
correctness,  which can be put l ike this:  
A pure mathematical  sentence is  correct,  or ﬁctional ist ical ly  correct,  i ff  it  is  true 
in the story of mathematics,  as deﬁned in the above way; or,  equivalent ly,  i f f  it  
would have been true if  there had actual ly existed abstract mathematical  objects 
of the kinds that platonists have in mind, i .e .,  the k inds that our mathematical  
theories purport to be about. ’  
The story of mathematics,  f rom what has been said by Balaguer,  seems  best  to be 
taken as a f ict ion, according to which mathematical  objects actual ly exist  and so ,  
in this f ict ion , the statements that purport to b e about these objects are true. 
This is  what makes them correct in our  world.  
In this case, the story of mathematics is  explained l ike a f ict ion and so a theory of 
f ict ion is  st i l l  relevant  and wil l  st i l l  have implications for their posit ion. It  has to 
go further than just storytell ing,  as mathematical  statements are  the same even 
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when told at different  t imes, in di fferent places and with different  mediums. Even 
if  the story is  taken as  a useful one and that usefulness is  the factor that 
determines whether statements are taken to be correct or incorrect in this world,  
the idea of a story of mathematics  st i l l  faces the problem of conceptualis ing 
mathematical  characters as f ict ional characters.  This is  because it  rel ies on the 
assumption that f ict ional characters do not exist  in any way . This is  how they hope 
this argument leads to  the non -existence of mathematical  characters.  However,  
they need a support ing the ory of f ict ion to argue for this posit ion on f ict ional 
characters.  Fict ionalists also face a problem further to this too. I f  they argu e from 
the posit ion that mathematical  statements are false ,  s ince mathematical  objects 
do not exist,  then it  is  hard to se e how they would use a story of mathematics to 
solve the issue of correctness.  If  mathematical  objects  do not exist ,  then what 
would a world where they do exist  be l ike ? Balaguer c laims that a mathematical  
statement is  t rue i ff  there actual ly existed abstr act mathematical  objects .  What 
would this mean to a  nominal ist,  who c laims there are no such things and would 
not want to concede that there could be?  In order to do this,  they would need a 
supporting theory of f ict ion to help show what mathematical  object s are or are 
comparable  to. Only then could they start  to explain why some mathematical  
statements are taken to be correct and others incorrect.  
Mathematical  real ists are able to explain the correctness as they are able to 
explain correct  statements as the  statements that are made true by the existence 
of the mathematical  objects that the statements refer to. The incorrect 
statements on the other hand are,  of course, the statements that are made fa lse 
by the objects the statements refer to. Fict ionalists on  the other hand are unable 
to explain the correctness of statements in this way as they cannot rely on the 
existence of the mathematical  objects to make certain statements true or false. 
They would therefore need to come up with a way of explaining how som e 
mathematical  statements are taken to be correct and others are taken to be 
incorrect in this world.  
Further to this ,  it  is  hard to see without a ful ly  formed theory of f ict ion that 
supports the f ict ional ist  posit ion how they can avoid introducing other a bstract  
objects whilst  t rying to rid us of our commitments to the more tradit ional 
mathematical  objects:  
‘One option within the semantics of f ict ion is  to view fict ional names as referr ing 
to abstract things,  “f ict ional characters”.  If  a l l  f ict ions are l ik e this,  f ict ionalism 
about arithmetic  would not be well  motivated by a desire  to avoid commitment to 
abstracta.  …  Another example. Fict ion operators l ike “according to Sherlock 
Holmes stories  …” typically  involve apparent  reference to stor ies,  or,  more 
generally,  f ict ional discourses. These seem n ot to be concrete things .  …  I f  they are 
abstract things,  then ontological  scruples about abstracta would not be well  
served by a f ict ional ism which re l ies upon fict ion operators.’  (Sainsbury,  2010, p3)  
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What ‘f ict ion ’  is  and what ‘f ict ional characters ’  are is  st i l l  being debated, and 
there are many theories that take them to be abstracta themselves ,  such as the 
theory of abstract art i facts (see Sainsbury,  2010 and Thomasson 1999, 2003) .  
Without a supporting theory of  f ict ion, the f ict ionalist  has no way of explaining 
the issues pointed at above and they have no way of guaranteeing that what they 
explain mathematics away with is  not abstracta itsel f.  In the next sections ,  I  wil l  
look at f ict ional ist  posit ions that do take f ict ion itse lf  to be important to the 
posit ion to see whether they avoid commitment to abstract objects.  
2.3 Similarit ies and Differences between Mathematics and Fict ion  
For a theory to be a f ict ional ist  one, it  must  at least appeal to the notion of  
f ict ion and thus invoke a supporting theory of f ict ion . For a mathematical  
f ict ionalist ,  then, there must be some comparison between mathematics and 
f ict ion, and there must be some features they share that enables the f ict ionalist  
conclus ion.  I  wi l l  look at  a discussion by Burgess (2004) that examines s imilar it ies 
and dif ferences between mathematics and f ict ion. The fol lowing outl ines varying 
comparisons between mathematics and f ict ion in order to show that any 
comparison is  not helpful to the f ict ionalist  d iscussion. Whilst  his  conclus ion 
overall  is  that f ict ionalism does not hold ( for di fferent reasons than I  shall  
conclude) his discussion is  st i l l  very useful at  outl ining what f ict ionalism must do 
if  it  is  to succeed, namely:  to show comparisons between ma thematics and f ict ion 
that explains where mathematical  statements get their content in order to answer 
the question of ontology of mathematical  objects .  Burgess discusses clear ways 
that mathematics is  non-fict ion:  
‘The compilers of the New York Times best -sel ler l ist  wi l l  never put any 
mathematical  work,  however wonderful ,  at  the top of the f ict ion column, and not 
just because nothing even by Andrew Wiles wil l  ever se l l  l ike Stephen King. Nor 
wil l  any l ibrarian catalogue, say,  the Proceedings of the Cabal Seminar,  as an 
'anthology of short stories based on the characters created by Georg Cantor' . ’   
It  seems clear to me that Burgess’s point that mathematics is  non -f ict ion or is  not 
f ict ion i l lustrates an issue for f ict ionalists.  For them to do away with the content 
of mathematical  statements whilst  st i l l  using them, the f ict ional ist  has at least 
two things to do. First ,  they must show that mathematics is  suff ic iently l ike  f ict ion 
so that they can do away with their commitment to the content of the statements.  
Second, they must out l ine a  theory of f ict ion that shows that we use f ict ional 
statements without any commitment to the content of the statements.  I  wil l  
address the f irst  of these init ial ly  and then expand on the second in sect ion 2.4.  
As Burgess points  out,  mathematics is  clearly non-f ict ion. So, to show that 
mathematics is  suff ic iently simi lar to f ict ion, he looks into f ict ion in a more 
specif ic  way. ‘So the question is:  in which respects is  mathematics  l ike,  and in 
which respects is  it  unlike,  f ict ion ? That in part depends on the species of the 
genus f ict ion one considers.’  (Burgess,  2004)  The idea is  that whilst  mathematics 
is  not simi lar enough to f ict ion to be counted as a f ict ion itse lf ,  by  dist inguishing 
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between different ‘genus’ of f ict ion ,  the f ict ional ist  may be able to draw a strong 
enough comparison between mathematics and a type of f ict ion.  This is  not the 
best f ict ionalist  posit ion, but  it  is  important  to show what exact ly is  needed by 
the f ict ionalist  in order for their posit ion to stand. N ot any simi lar ity between 
mathematics and f ict ion wil l  do.  After l ist ing a few types of f ict ions that have 
been discussed in regard to their l ikeness to mathematics,  Burgess lands on fables 
as the most apt genus of f ict ion to compare mathematics to:  
‘ I  bel ieve the comparison with fables is  the most apt of the candidates I  have 
considered, and comparison with novels the least so. Novels almost always are 
attributable to ident if iable individual authors,  Proust or Flaubert,  Trollope or 
Dickens. Some fables are  attr ibutable to such authors,  Lafontaine for instance, 
others are tradit ional.  Mathematics a lso consists of both tradit ional elements and 
elements with identif iable authors.  Novels are almost always unique. Fables tend 
to be retold over and over in varian t vers ions by dif ferent writers ,  so that we have 
Aesop's  version, Lafontaine's version, and many latter -day retel l ings of the fox 
and the crow, for instance. Mathematics l ikewise gets retold by textbook writer 
after textbook writer.  The characters  in one n ovel seldom reappear in another,  
and even those who do reappear,  l ike Swann or Pall iser,  do so only in 
comparatively few stories,  a l l  by the same author.  This is  so with some characters 
of fable,  but many, l ike the clever fox,  reappear in whole cyc les of t ales.  The same 
mathematical ia,  πand e ,  the sine and cosine funct ions,  0 and 1 and 2,  and so on, 
reappear throughout whole l ibrar ies of mathematical  works. Again,  characters 
encountered in novels  are general ly of the same species as those encountered in 
dai ly l i fe ,  whi le those in fables  are,  as one dictionary def init ion reminds us,  beings 
of a di fferent order,  'animals that ta lk and behave l ike human beings' .  
Mathematics,  too, has  objects even more unlike those of any other subject,  and it  
is  for precise ly that reason that  there is  thought to be a philosophical  problem 
about them.’  (Burgess,  2004, p 21-22) 
So unlike novels ,  fables are the best type of f ict ion to compare to mathematics for 
Burgess.  He gives numerous examples  of how they are simi lar in the way they do 
not have a part icular author to attribute their creat ion to,  they are retold over 
and over,  and their characters are often shared between many of the works,  as 
well  as these characters being very dif ferent  from those encountered in real l i fe .  
Whilst  there are cases of these examples being correct ,  there wil l  always be 
counter examples such that the comparisons do not hold. Furthermore, none of 
these comparisons explains the crucia l  f ict ionalist  point,  which is  that we can 
make use of mathematical  st atements without having commitment to the content 
of the statements.  I f  i t  is  the case that we do not have commitment to the content 
of the fables,  such that we are not committed ontologically  to their worlds and 
characters etc .,  it  would not be because they do not have a part icular author to be 
attributed to,  or because of them being retold over and over in many ways. As a 
result ,  these comparisons may show that mathematics can be l ike f ict ion in a way, 
but they do not show any l ikeness in any way that mat ters for any ontological  
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argument. They do not explain where f ict ion get s its  content from and so cannot 
be used to explain the same for mathematics.  
It  is  l ikely from what fol lows in his discuss ion that Burgess never intended to 
argue that these s imilarit ies  are suff icient bases on which to bui ld a model of 
f ict ionalism. However,  it  is  st i l l  important to  note that not any l ikeness between 
mathematics and f ict ion wil l  do for the f ict ionalist .  They must be compared in 
some way that has some bearing on the ontology of the contents of the f ict ion. 
Whilst  Burgess’  comparisons do not quite hit  the mark, he points to another 
comparison for  the f ict ional ist  to make with fables that makes them the best 
genus of f ict ion to compare mathematics to:  
‘Yet more important is  the matter of appl ication, which in l iterature typically  
takes the form of a 'message'.  The fable typically  though not invar iably has a 
'moral' ,  whi le to demand one of the novel is  v irtually the definit ion of 
Phil ist inism.  …  The question of appl icat ions is  crucia l  in the case of mathematics,  
because though it  would be a k ind of Phi l ist inism to demand that every piece of 
mathematics have one, many do;  and it  is  precisely because many do that many 
phi losophers have opposed nominalism, this being the least common denominator 
of al l  ' indispensabil ity arguments' . ’  (p 22)  
Fables are therefore the best genus of f ict ion to compare to mathematics because , 
unl ike novels,  they have an appl ication, a moral.  This is  a useful comparison 
because, as Burgess states,  the applicabi l ity of mathematics is  the basis  on which 
many philosophers oppose nominalism and support platonism. This is  because it  
would be a miracle fo r  mathematics to be so  applicable to sc ient if ic  theory if  it  
were an acc ident ;  so,  for many platonists ,  this i t  taken to be proof of the 
truthfulness of mathematical  statements.  However,  much l ike the comparisons 
outl ined previously,  the fact alone that fa bles have an application is  not a 
suff icient comparison to the applications of  mathematics to draw the f ict ional ist  
conclus ion.  As the applicat ions are themselves dif ferent ,  a fable is  not applied to 
scient if ic  theory in the same way mathematics is .  So eve n if  it  was the fact  that 
fables have applicat ions that led f ict ional ists to deny commitment to their 
content,  because this applicat ion is  di fferent to the applications of mathematics it  
is  hard to see why this  would carry over to it  from this comparison a lone.  
However,  it  is  not even the case that  fables’  applicat ions lead us to deny 
commitment to their content.  It  requires a further argument to explain why we 
are not committed to their content ;  it  is  not their message that leads to this 
conclus ion.  So not only is  their appl ication different to the application of 
mathematics,  their application does not lead to us not being committed to their  
content.  The analogy with fables here could be useful in that we might take their  
role to be simi lar to that of meta phors,  but I  wil l  be looking into that discussion in 
section 2.4.  
Up to now the s imilarit ies that hold between mathematics and f ict ion that  I  have 
discussed have yet to show convincingly why f ict ionalists are able  to continue to 
29 
 
use mathematical  statement s whilst  discarding any commitment to the content of  
their statements.  What,  then, is  the main comparison to f ict ion that dr ives the 
f ict ionalist  conclusion ? Burgess summarises it  nicely:   
‘St i l l  yet more important,  however,  is  a feature common to al l  genr es of f ict ion. 
The most important single respect in which f ict ionalists hold mathematics to be 
l ike novels or fables or whatever is  in  being a body of fa lsehoods. Especia l ly  the 
existence theorems of mathematics are supposed to be untrue:  these say there 
exist,  for instance, pr ime numbers greater than 10, whereas according to 
mathematical  f ict ional ists,  and indeed al l  nominalists,  there are no such things as 
numbers  at a l l . ’  
So,  the main comparison that f ict ionalists would l ike to make between 
mathematics and f ict ion is  that they are a body of falsehoods, and it  is  because 
the statements are fa lse that in both cases we are not committed to their 
contents.  
Burgess is  wrong, however,  that  f ict ion is  a body of fa lsehoods . This is  because 
there are plenty of pro posit ions in a lot of f ict ion that are accepted as true, e.g.  
grass is  green,  people die when hit  by speeding trains,  etc .  So,  it  is  important to 
see how the f ict ionalist  attempts to explain how mathematics is  not only the same 
as f ict ion but a lso explain why they are l ike the false statements in f ict ion, rather 
than the accepted true ones . To do so,  I  shall  focus Yablo’s account,  which is  the  
most developed account of mathematics  which draws on a n establ ished theory of 
f ict ion in a way that  tr ies to explai n where their content comes from and why we 
should not be committed to the existence of this  content .  
2.4 Mathematics as a Useful Fict ion  
Fictional ism hopes to retain the usefulness of mathematics that platonists explain 
with truth.By comparing mathematics to f ict ion , they hope to do this without 
appeal to truth.  But a lot of f ict ion is  not useful,  and so the comparison to f ict ion 
does not necessari ly  help mathematics.  This can be i l luminated in the fol lowing 
parallel  in discuss ing mental f ict ionalism:  
‘…  the mental f ict ionalist  a im of retaining a representation without its 
commitments is  often expressed by envisaging [folk psychology] as a ‘useful 
f ict ion’.  But f ict ion is  not an obvious model for the ‘useful’  representation 
required by the f ict ionalist,  s ince identifying something as f ict ion leaves open the 
possibi l ity of it  being unreliable in var ious ways. Thus,  to make good on the notion 
of a useful f ict ion, the f ict ionalist  needs to specify the ways in which [folk  
psychology] can be  both useful and a f ict ion’ (Bourne and Caddick Bourne, 2018a)  
The f ict ionalist  needs to have a theory of f ict ion to support their c laims. 
Fict ional ists need to show how mathematics  can be shown to be l ike f ict ion in the 
sense of  al lowing us to let go of any commitment to the content of the 
statements.  In addit ion, the applicabil ity of mathematics  has to be explained, for 
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this  is  one of the main reasons that some philosophers take an ant i -nominalist  
posit ion regarding mathematical  objects .  As  Yablo says:   
‘The f i rst  point people  make is  that since applicabi l ity would be a miracle i f  the 
mathematics involved were not true, it  is  evidence that mathematics is  true. The 
second thing that gets  said (what on some theories of evidence is  a corollary of 
the f i rst)  i s  that applicabil ity is  explained in part by truth.  …  The most that can be 
said in general  about why mathematics appl ies is  that it  is  t rue. ’  (Yablo,  200 5, p 
89-90)  
Yablo denies that the applicabi l ity of mathematics is  explained by its truth.  For 
Yablo,  and for f ict ionalists,  the help mathematics g ives to science ‘ is  a kind it  
could give even if  it  were false . ’  (p 90)  This ‘usefulness -without-truth’ stance to 
mathematics is  common between the major ity of f ict ional ist  arguments,  but they 
often der ive this  usefulness-without-truth v ia different ideas. F ield (1980) ,  for 
example, has an account of how mathematics is  useful without being true. As 
explained above in section 1.3,  h is idea is  that mathematical  theories get their 
usefulness by being conservative ove r nominalist  theories .  However,  Yablo has 
two issues with F ield’s  approach to mathematics’  usefulness -without-truth:  
‘ I  do not doubt that Field has shown us a way in which mathematics can  be useful 
without being true.  … This leaves more or less untouched, however,  the problem 
of how mathematics does  manage to be useful without being true.  …  Field might 
think that the role of mathematics in the non-nominalist ic  theories that sc ient ists 
really use is  analogous to its role in connect ion with custom -bui lt  nominal ist ic  
theories.  …  I f  that were Field’s view, then one suspects he would have done more 
to develop the analogy. Is  the view, then, that he has not  explained (or justif ied) 
actual appl ications of mathematics –  but that is  OK because, come the revoluti on, 
these actual applications wil l  be supplanted by the new -style appl ications of 
which he has  treated? This stands our usual approach to recalcitrant phenomena 
on its head.’  (Yablo, 2005, p 91–92) 
Whilst  Fie ld accounts  for how mathematics is  able to be us eful  without being true, 
it  does not help at al l  to show how it  does so for those applying mathematics in 
the way that they commonly do. Sc ientists who do ‘regular old platonic science’ 
actually apply mathematical  theory ;  they do not just use them as short cuts in the 
way Field suggests.  So, in order to explain this,  Field either needs this application 
of mathematics to be analogous for the role  mathematics has in connection to the 
nominal ist ic  theories Field discusses,  or these actual appl icat ions wil l  be 
supplanted by the new-style appl ications. Yablo suggests that F ield has not done 
enough work in his discussion of mathematics’  usefulness -without-truth for either 
of these suggestions to come to fruit ion. As it  stands ,  then, Fie ld’s  attempt to 
show mathematics as useful without being true does not ful ly  explain how it  does 
so for actual appl icat ions of mathematics .   
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The reason Fie ld does not address the appl ication of mathematics as well  as it  
requires is  because his argument is  more designed to address indi spensabi l ity over 
applicabi l ity.  Yablo targets applicabi l ity over indispensabil ity:  
‘How is the Fie ldian nominalist  to explain the usefulness -without-truth of 
mathematics in ordinary,  quant itative,  sc ience? More important,  though, suppose 
that an explanation can be given. Then indispensabi l ity  becomes a red herr ing. 
Why should we be asked to demathematicize science …  Putt ing both of these 
together:  The point  of  nominal iz ing a theory  is  not achieved unless a further 
condit ion is  met,  given which condit ion t here is  no longer any need to nominalize 
the theory. ’  (Yablo, 2005, p 93)  
Yablo’s hope is  to show that if  mathematics can be applied to science in the way 
that it  is  actual ly done so,  but can be shown to do so without  being true, then 
there is  no need to d ispense of the use of mathematics in science.  As a result ,  for 
Yablo,  mathematics can be indispensable to science, but  if  its  appl ication does not 
guarantee the truth of  mathematical  statements ,  then we would st i l l  not be 
required to believe in the existen ce of mathematical  objects.  Yablo’s approach to 
the usefulness -without-truth conclus ion is  to argue that mathematics does not 
need to be true to be applied to science in the way that it  is .  To do this,  he argues 
that numbers can serve as representat ional a ids.  As representat ional a ids ,  they 
are used to state something which has nothing to do with numbers. He gives the 
fol lowing example to i l lustrate his point .  A physicist  discovers the fol lowing :   
‘ (A) A project i le f ired at so many meters per  second from th e surface of a 
planetary sphere so many ki lograms in mass and so many meters in  diameter wi l l  
(wil l  not)  escape its gravitational f ield.’   
But without quantify ing over mathematical  objects,  she would run into problems 
recording facts of this  kind:   
‘One is  that s ince velocit ies range along a continuum, she wi l l  have to write 
uncountably many sentences .  …  Second, almost al l  reals are ‘random’ in the sense 
of encoding an irreducibly inf inite amount of  information. So, unless we think 
there is  room in English for uncountably many semantic pr imitives,  almost al l  of  
the uncountably many sentences wil l  have to be inf inite in length. ’  
In order to escape this issue ,Yablo puts it  that we just sum up the facts as :   
‘ (B) For a l l  posit ive real numbers M and R, the escap e velocity from a sphere of 
mass M and diameter 2R is  the square root of 2GM/R, where G is  the gravitational 
constant .’  (Yablo, 2005, p 94)  
The role of numbers in this example is  as  representational a ids.  What is  trying to 
be expressed has nothing to do wi th mathematical  objects.  Their purpose is  just to 
state f initely  that which otherwise could not be stated so. Do numbers need to 
exist  in order to play this representational role? Yablo does not think so:  
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‘That (B) succeeds in gathering together into  a sin gle content inf initely many facts 
of form (A) owes nothing whatever to the real existence of numbers. It  is  enough 
that we understand what (B) asks of the non -numerical world,  the numerical  world 
taken momentari ly  for  granted.’  (p 95)  
So, he argues,  numbers do not need to exist  in order for (B) to achieve its aim of 
summing up the infinitely many facts ,  because we need only take the numerical  
world for granted momentari ly .  And this is  how Yablo hopes to reach the 
usefulness-without-truth of mathematics.  If  numbers are merely representational 
aids and we need only  momentari ly  take for granted the numerical  world to use 
them as representations,  then they can cont inue to be appl ied to scienti f ic  
theories without the requirement of exist ing. This avoids the issue that Yablo 
raised for F ield,  as it  c learly does not clash with how sc ientists actual ly use 
mathematics.  
However,  it  is  not clear what  the Yablo-style  f ict ionalist  means when they refer to 
a ‘numerical  world’  that is  momentari ly  taken for granted, s ince,  according to 
them, it  does not exist.  Presumably ,  they believe some conception of f ict ion 
explains how we can in some way refer to something, even momentari ly,  without 
it  exist ing. The theory  Yablo endorses,  as well  as other prominent  f ict ionalists,  is  
that of make believe games. Through this,  Yablo gives an account of how numbers 
can be used as representational a ids that can be applied to science , as well  as 
helping us learn more about the representat ions themselves.  
2.4.1 Make Bel ieve Games  
Make believe games can be understood as pretending that  something is  the case. 
An example would be when playing at working in a shop . We can pretend that a 
table is  a shop counter,  that household items are the items in the store and that 
we are the employees and the c ustomers in the shop. The items and roles that are 
imagined make up the content of the game.  
‘[T]o elaborate and adapt oneself  to the game’s content is  typically  the game’s 
very point.  An alternative point suggests itself ,  though, when we reflect that a l l  
but the most boring games are played with props ,  whose game-independent 
propert ies help to determine what it  is  that players are supposed to imagine.’  
(Yablo,  2005, p 96)  
The props we use also  have an impact on the game. So, in the case of our pretend 
shop, the items in the store do not fol low just  from the content of  the game (that 
is  the imagined items and roles),  it  is  the household items we have at hand 
determines this  also .  The idea fol lows from this that there are two ways of 
viewing these pretend games. Ordinar i ly ,  the props are important to the extent 
that they inf luence the content of the game, but it  could a lso be the case that the 
content of the game sheds l ight on the props themselves. Walton  (1993)  cal ls  
these ‘content-oriented ’  and ‘prop-oriented ’  games of  make-believe. Content-
oriented make-bel ieve is  when the focus of the game is on the content.  Prop -
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oriented make-bel ieve in contrast,  is  when we focus on the props as the aim of 
the game, using the game for the purpose of i l luminating the props used. Walton 
gives a few cases of this:  
‘“Where in Ita ly is  the town of Crotone? ”  I  ask.  You explain that it  is  on the arch 
of the Ita l ian boot. “See that thundercloud over there –  the big,  angry face near 
the horizon” ,  you say;  “ it  is  headed this way ”  …  We think of Italy and the 
thunderclouds as something l ike pictures. Italy (or a map of Italy)  depicts a boot. 
The cloud is  a prop which makes it  f ict ional that there is  an angry face.’  (Walton, 
1993, p 40-41) 
In the case of the pretend shop, the props ass ist  in helping us e laborate the 
content of the game and al low us to engage in the game. The toys and objects 
around the house are gathered in a way to represent products in a  shop and they 
are brought up to the table (counter)  and purchased (exchanged for pretend 
currency).  In this game, it  is  the clear that the props are helping to elaborate the 
content of the game for us,  but in Walton’s examples,  which i l lustrate prop -
oriented make-bel ieve, it  is  the other way around. We learn more about the props 
in the game (Italy and the thundercloud) from the content of the game of make -
believe. We are able to point to where in Ita ly (or where on a map of Italy)  
Crotone is,  and we are able to point to a thundercloud in a sky of c louds as a 
result  of the content of our make -believe. I t  is  because of the imagery of the boot 
and the angry face that we are able to learn more about the props themselves. 
This is  s imi lar to what  Yablo wishes to claim about numbe rs.  
By having mathematics serve as a f ict ion that is  useful because it  helps eluc idate 
condit ions of the real world,  Yablo is  able to make a comparison between 
mathematics and f ict ion that seems to  show mathematics to be a  useful f ict ion.  
Yablo writes:  
‘numbers as they f igure in applied mathematics are creatures of ex istential  
metaphor .  They are part of a realm that we play a long with because the pretense 
affords a desirable –  sometimes irreplaceable –  mode of access to certain real -
world condit ions,  v iz.  the condit ions that make a pretense l ike that appropriate in 
the relevant game.’  (p 98)  Continuing with Walton’s theory,  a metaphor is  ‘an 
utterance that  represents its  objects as being l ike so :  the way that they need  to be 
to make the utterance ‘correct’  in a game that it  itse lf  suggests .’  (Yablo,  200 5).   
Similarly ,  to the examples given above, numbers are the content that we use in a 
pretence to learn more about the prop . In the case where the props are the ent ire 
world,  prop-or iented games become world -oriented games.  So:  
‘as we make as i f ,  e.g. ,  people have associated with them stores of something 
called ‘ luck’,  so as to be able to descr ibe some  of  them metaphorical ly  as 
individuals whose luck is  ‘running out ’,  we make as if  pluralit ies have associated 
w ith them things cal led ‘numbers’ ,  so as to be able to express an (otherwise hard 
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to express because)  infinitely disjunct ive fact about re lative cardinalit ies l ike so:  
The number of Fs  is  divisible by the number of Gs . ’  (p 98)  
Using this conception of f ict i on al lows Yablo  to explain the usefulness -without-
truth of mathematics in the fol lowing way. When we use m athematics,  we are 
engaging in a make believe  game. Under the pretence of the game, we pretend 
that the mathematical  objects that make up the content of the make believe  game 
exist,  s imi lar ly to how when playing shopping, we imagine that the products of the 
shop exist  and the counter that we take them to exist.  But instead of being 
content-or iented, l ike  the game of shop, applied mathematics is  prop -oriented 
and,  in the case of applied mathematics  the world is  the prop that  we are focusing 
on. Yablo cal ls  this  world-oriented. L ike the example of Ita ly (or the map of Ita ly)  
being a boot,  it  is  the content of the game (that Italy is  a boot) that al lows us to 
learn about the prop. By engaging in this preten ce, the numbers can help us to 
express real world condit ions that otherwise we would not be able  to. That 
explains the usefulness of mathematics in the way that we actual ly apply them , 
unl ike in Field’s attempt.  
A question remains ,  though, once we r id mathematical  statements of any truth. 
How can one explain the correctness of mathematical  statements? It  is  c lear that 
some mathematical  statements are correct,  and others are taken to not be so. The 
platonist  is  able to account for this correctness because , for them, the correct 
statement is  the true one and the incorrect statement is  the fa lse one. If  the 
f ict ionalist  is  successful in r idding themselves of the ontological  burden of 
mathematical  objects,  they must also explain how it  is  that the application of 
some mathematical  statements is  correct and others incorrect.  
2.4.2 Objectivity and Correctness  
Can the f ict ionalist  who takes prop-oriented make-believe as  an explanation for 
mathematics’  usefulness -without-truth explain why some mathematical  
statements are taken to be correct whilst  others are not? Yablo does not give a 
definit ive account but  he has an idea where an answer could begin. Importantly he 
compares mathematics to metaphor where ‘a dist inct ion i s  often drawn between 
true metaphors and metaphors that are apt. ’  (p 100-101) The claim is  that a 
metaphor can be true without being apt  and vice versa. He gives examples of true 
but not apt metaphors  such as ‘Tooth Decay:  America’s Si lent Dental Ki l ler’  and 
‘South America:  Sleeping Giant on Our Doorstep’.   Whilst  these metaphors  aim at 
truth, they miss out on the important part  of metaphors that real ly makes them 
apt.  Yablo suggests that this  aptness is  also part of prop -oriented make-believe 
games:   
‘Aptness is  at least  a feature of prop-or iented make-believe games;  a game is apt 
relative to such and such a subject -matter to the extent that it  lends itself  to the 
expression of truths about that subject matter.  A part icular metaphorical  
utterance  i s  apt to  the extent that  (a)  it  is  a move in an apt game, and (b) i t  makes 
impressive use of the resources that game provides.’  (p 102)  
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The aptness of our prop-oriented make-believe game of Italy being a boot is  
determined by how it  helps our knowing about the pro p. It  is  apt,  considering how 
in Walton’s example it  helped us learn the location of Crotone, and could be used 
further to learn about  other locations in Ita ly,  or Italy’s  location relative to other 
places .  (Albania is  located on the right hand side of the  heel .)  The example of the 
angry face being a thundercloud is  another apt metaphor,  but perhaps less apt 
than Italy being a boot. Whi lst  it  lends itself  to the express ion of some truths ( l ike 
which c loud is  being pointed to,  and the shape it  takes) it  seem s to lend i tself  less 
so to the express ion of truths than the example of Italy being a boot. Overall ,  we 
can determine the aptness of a prop -oriented make-believe game relative to its 
subject-matter by the extent to which it  lends itse lf  to the expression of truths 
about that subject  matter.  After accepting this move, it  is  a simple step to the 
idea that to show correctness in mathematics is  to demonstrate aptness in prop-
oriented games of  make-bel ieve where mathematical  objects are the props. Yablo 
sums this up in the fol lowing:  
‘ I  want to say that a proposed new axiom A  str ikes us as correct roughly to the 
extent that a theory incorporat ing A  seems to us to make for an apter  game –   a 
game that lends itse lf  to the express ion of more metaphorical  truths –  than a 
theory that omitted A ,  or incorporated its negation. To cal l  A  correct is  to single it  
out as possessed of a  great deal of ‘cognit ive promise’. ’  (p 102)  
In the case of world-oriented make-believe games that involve mathematics being 
applied to a theory,  the numbers  or mathematic al  statements involved are the 
content of the make -believe game whi lst  the world itse lf  is  the prop of the game. 
For a mathematical  theory to be seen as correct,  it  must lend itse l f  to the 
expression of truths about the world b etter than not us ing it  or us ing its negat ion. 
Further to this ,  we must  take into account the histor y of mathematical  application 
and currently accepted mathematical  theory. This is  because some mathematical  
statements are correct not because they express truths about the world better 
than not us ing them, but s imply because they fol low from other mathematical  
statements that have already been taken to be correct.  Yablo’s  account of 
correctness then ‘has two parts.  Sometimes a statement is  correct  because it  is  
true according to an implicit ly  understood background story …  sometimes though 
there is  no well -enough understood background story …  the second kind of 
correctness goes with a statement’s ‘cognit ive promise’,  that is,  its  being suited to 
f igure in especia l ly  apt pretend games.’  (p 103).  Yablo does not provide this as a 
definit ive account of correctness in mathematics but just how it  could be the case. 
Following this,  though, f ict ional ists have at least an outl ine of an account of how 
it  is  that some mathematical  statements are taken to be more correct than others ,  
whilst  uti l is ing the notion of f ict ion .  
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2.5 Problems with Yablo’s  account  
2.5.1 Problem of Content and  Ontology 
The whole f ict ionalist  project rel ies on the idea that by comparing mathematics to 
f ict ion, they can r id us of our ontological  commitments that the truth of 
mathematical  statements burdens us with. However,  there is  no guarantee that 
this would be the case. Bourne and Caddick Bourne write:  
‘ It  is  easy to assume that there can be content without ontological  commitment 
for the very reason that ( it  is  often assumed) f ict ion can be contentful without 
being committal.  But a theory of f ict ion might hold  that what it  is  for a f ict ion to 
have content is  for there to exist  the things  the f ict ion is  about. …  Mere appeal to 
f ict ion does not,  without a support ing theory of f ict ion, guarantee avoiding 
commitment to whatever the f ict ion is  about. Neither does a n approach to 
f ict ional truth in terms of imagination or games of make -believe automatical ly  
al low us,  as might be assumed, a non -committal  account of f ict ional content.  One 
might agree that it  is  prescr ipt ions to imagine (for example) which determine that  
the f ict ion is  about this rather than that,  whilst  st i l l  holding that what al lows it  to 
be about  anything is  that there exist  things that it  is  about. ’  (2018a)  
Suppose we grant that  Walton’s example of descriptive prop -or iented make-
believe games al lows Y ablo to attempt to explain mathematics in the same way. 
Without a further theory of f ict ion that r ids  us of our commitments to the 
contents of f ict ion, any f ict ionalist  attempt to remove commitments to the 
content of mathematics by comparing it  to f ict ion would not work.  All  that would 
do is  describe the nature of mathematics to be that of f ict ion, whether that be as 
possibi l it ies,  non-existents or even abstract entit ies (See Sainsbury,  2001 for 
further discussion).  If  the content of f ict ion is  itse lf  abstr act,  then the comparison 
to f ict ion that f ict ionalists attempt would only be helping to show how 
mathematical  objects are abstract objects.  The f ict ional ist  comparison of 
mathematics to f ict ion alone does not do enough to show mathematics usefulness -
without-truth that they wish to conclude and as a result  they do not show why we 
can let go of our commitment to the existence of abstract objects.  
In part 1  I  concluded that ,  in order to undermine conformational holism  (and the 
indispensabi l ity argument) ,  the nominal ist  needs to explain away  the use of  
ideal isat ions as being used  f igurat ively .   They also needed to show that the use of 
mathematics  in science is  analogous to these f igurat ive uses of idealisat ions . But 
even further to this,  they need to explain why  we have no ontological  commitment 
to these idealisations and mathematical  statements.  I  have shown above that 
f ict ionalism requires a  supporting theory of f ict ion, in order to explain where the 
content of these f igurative mathematical  statements comes fro m. A comparison to 
f ict ion does not do this alone without a further argument to show how fict ion can 
have content without requiring any ontological  commitments.  Because of this,  it  
does not seem that the conclus ion of the indispensabi l ity argument can be 
undermined by way of  f ict ionalism  without this further explanation of non -
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committal  content .  Yablo tries  to solve this problem by arguing mathematical  
statements are related to f ict ion via metaphor and this is  where the content 
comes from. However,  the next  sect ion wi l l  look at issues with this .  
2.5.2 Problem of Contentful  Metaphor  
Walton’s examples of Italy and the thundercloud show how fict ion can be used for 
descriptive purposes. In these cases,  it  is  because we have an understanding of 
the content of the  game that al lows for us to learn more about the props. Because 
we know the shape of a boot,  it  is  useful to pretend Italy is  one so that we can 
learn about the prop ( Italy),  and because we know what an angry face looks l ike ,  
we are able to point to a thun dercloud that resembles it  when we pretend it  is  
one. However,  we lack this independent  understanding in re lation to 
mathematical  objects.  It  is  not as clear how we can ever come to have this 
understanding of mathematical  objects,  i f  they do not exist .  Thi s is  a simi lar issue 
that can be taken with Balaguer’s attempt to  dismiss the inclusion of f ict ion. 
Without a supporting theory of f ict ion , we are unable to gain a c lear enough 
understanding of what  mathematical  objects  would be l ike,  so we would not be 
able to explain how we are able to use them in the way Yablo thinks we can.  
Yablo’s account does go further than Balaguer,  however,  and gives  a direct 
comparison when he compares the metaphor of luck running out with our use of 
numbers  in scientif ic  theory.  
The example of luck running out is  less obvious as the boot and the angry face.  
Yablo thinks  that he can show with this example that we can talk of such things  as 
‘ luck’  without  there being any such thing,  i .e.  without  the ta lk having any content.  
But as I  have discussed throughout Part 2,  i t  needs some sort of content,  or it  is  
hard to make sense of  what it  means when people use the word ‘ luck’.  One way it  
would be possible to give talk of luck the content it  needs is  to imagine a world 
that is  run by some kind of normative law, such that people have stores of what is  
called ‘ luck’.  These laws determine that for  each fortuitous  thing that happens 
this store is  reduced. In such a world,  this is  known as their luck ‘running out’ .  We 
can then draw useful comparisons between such worlds and our own, art iculating 
features of ours in terms of luck,  without having to believe that luck is  a feature 
of our world. 1 It  is  not diff icult  to understand a poss ibi l ity l ike this  and so the 
contents of the prop-oriented make -bel ieve game of saying someone’s luck is  
‘running out’  l ike in Yablo’s example is  not so different from the examples from 
Walton. And through this way of giving content to the ta lk of luck ,  we have a way 
of grasping a l l  of the components in talk of luck.  
This is  not the case for the idea of associat ing numbers to pluralit ies.  I f  numbers 
are just ‘creatures of existential  metaphor’  then Yablo is  suggest ing their content 
comes from metaphors.  A metaphor works by comparing exist ing things that we 
are able to grasp, as each side of the comparison has independent  content.  In the 
                                                          
1 For  further  d iscussion of  how such  normative features l ike th is  might  be ‘ seen in ’  non -
normat ive  aspects  o f  the world,  see Bourne and  Cadd ick  Bourne (2018b) .  
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case of the thundercloud being an angry face, the thundercloud gets its  content 
from our experience of thunderclouds (or in the case of seeing the cloud and then 
stating the metaphor,  it s  content  comes from the thundercloud we see),  and the 
angry face is  graspable as we have an understanding of angry faces,  and it  gets its  
content from this.  The metaphor would not land or work if  we were unable to 
grasp it ,  i f  we were unaware of the where  either of the side of  the comparison 
gets its  content.  An example of this,  could be one close fr iend saying to the other 
that they are Shaggy and Scooby Doo, when the other fr iend has no knowledge of 
Scooby Doo. In this case, the metaphor would not land, but it  st i l l  makes sense as 
a metaphor because both sides of the comparison derive their content 
independent ly of the metaphor itse lf .  But ,  the content of ‘mathematical’  
metaphors would be generated solely from the metaphor itsel f.  This could not be 
the case,  as how would we ever f irst  gain the understanding of the mathematical  
object in  order to use it  in the metaphors it  only exists in ? As a result,  
mathematical  metaphors would not only not land but would not make sense at a l l .  
Therefore, arguing that num bers are ‘creatures of existent ial  metaphor’  which get 
their content from these metaphors does not l ine up neat ly with Yablo’s 
comparison of luck running out.  Without showing how we could have a metaphor 
that works without a s ide of the comparison having c ontent independent  of the 
metaphor,  Yablo fa i ls  to convincingly show how numbers can just be ‘creatures of 
existential  metaphor. ’  Further to this,  the use of metaphor itself  would not be a 
way to absolve us of any ontological  commitment ;  rather,  it  would invoke it  
because of  its  requirement of comparing exist ing things with independent 
content.  
So, it  seems the attempt to remove our commitments to the existence of 
mathematical  objects via the f ict ionalist  avenue of invoking f ict ion to i l luminate 
how mathematics represents  is  not convincing.  One of the best attempts at this is  
seen in Yablo’s reconstruction of mathematics as a form of Walton’s  idea of  
metaphor as prop-oriented make-believe. The suggestion that numbers are 
‘creatures of existential  metaphor’  s eems well  constructed on the face of it .  
However,  it  does not successful ly give any indicat ion of how the content of the 
mathematical  metaphor is  init ial ly  generated, since i f  they only exist  as part of 
the metaphor ,  we would never come to understand them before us ing the 
metaphor (and because of this we would never be able to f i rst  use the metaphor ) .  
This leaves the  f ict ionalist  project as a whole a major issue, as without a 
supporting theory of f ict ion that shows we can use f ict ional  statements without 
any commitment to the existence of their content,  there is  no reason to assume 
we can do the same for mathematical  statements.  Without any progress toward 
solving these issues,  the f ict ional ist  c laim that we are not committed to the 
existence of abstract objects is  not convincing.   
Conclusion 
In the f i rst  section, I  gave a framework for the naturalist  posit ion and how it  leads 
us to the indispensabi l ity argument. This argument states that we should be 
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committed to the existence of mathematical  objects because  they are 
indispensable to our best scient if ic  theories and their  existence is  confirmed by 
the success of those theories.  I  looked at  arguments raised against this argument ,  
starting with Field’s attempt to show mathematics as dispensable.  However,  as it  
stands,  no one has done the work needed to make Field’s posit ion ful ly  
convincing. I  then looked at problems raised for the conformational holism 
premise of the indispensabil ity argument that hoped to undermine the 
indispensabi l ity argument’s conclusion by  removing the conf irmation the 
existence of mathematical  objects receives from the success of our best sc ient if ic  
theories.  This led to resting on the idea that mathematical  statements could be 
used f igurat ively .  The idea that mathematical  statements can be used f iguratively 
comes from a discussion of idealisations,  in  which it  is  argued that  talk of 
fr ict ionless surfaces and cont inuous l iquids are just used in science f igurat ively 
and their  use is  not meant to conf irm the ex istence of such ideals .  And so it  is  
argued in the same way that mathematical  statements are just used in science 
f igurat ively,  and their use in scientif ic  theories does not conf irm their existence. 
If  this is  the case, then the existence of mathematical  objects would not be 
confirmed by the success of our best scienti f ic  theory and the conclus ion of the 
indispensabi l ity argument would not stand.  
So, to explore this c laim further,  I  looked into mathematical  f ict ionalism. This is  
the idea that ,  through some comparison with f ict ion,  we can get  the usefulness of 
mathematics without being committed to any truths. I  showed why it  is  v ital  to 
the f ict ionalist  that they have some support ing theory of f ict ion to  argue their 
point .  I  explored Yablo’s f ict ionalism as one that takes the inclusion of  a theory of 
f ict ion seriously and showed how he compares mathematics to useful f ict ion and 
arrives at  the conclus ion that mathematical  objects are creatures of metaphor. I  
showed how Yablo uses this to explain the correctness and objectivity of 
mathematics,  a posit ion that is  not ful ly  f leshed out but does just ice to these 
features of mathematics.  I  showed that Yablo’s account st i l l  faces the issue that 
his supporting theory of f ict ion does not ful ly  account for where the content of his  
f ict ional mathematical  statements comes from. If  mathematical  objects are 
creatures of metaphor,  then the content of the metaphors  that use them is 
generated from the metaphors themselves.  So f ict ional ists who attempt to treat 
mathematical  statements f iguratively have more to do to show that this  strategy 
could work in a more satisfactory way. Because of this ,  there is  no reason to 
reject the conclusion of the indispensabil ity argument,  that we should be 
committed to the existence of mathematical  objects stands,  and is  good reason to 
accept it .  
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